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CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The privilege against self-incrimination contained in the fifth 
amendment to the United States Constitution is invoked with 
some frequency in the reporting of income to the Internal Reve-
nue Service. Unfortunately, no definite standard for the applica-
bility of this privilege to income reporting has emerged. In this 
comment, the author reviews decisional law on the applicability 
of this privilege to income reporting and analyzes under what 
circumstances this privilege can be invoked. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April fifteenth of each year,l a taxpayer who has violated a crim-
inal law during the preceeding year is placed in a difficult situation. If 
the taxpayer reports information required on a federal income tax re-
turn, 2 any incriminating information reported is admissible to prosecute 
the taxpayer. 3 If the taxpayer attempts to avoid self-incrimination by 
providing false answers on a return, the taxpayer commits perjury.4 Fi-
nally, if the taxpayer fails to file any return at all, the taxpayer may com-
mit a tax crime. 5 The taxpayer thus faces a trilemma.6 
Invoking the fifth amendment's7 protection against self-incrimina-
tion on a tax return is one possible solution to the trilemma.8 Filing an 
income tax return with fifth amendment claims in place of many of the 
required disclosures, however, creates a variety of other problems. The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), alleging the fifth amendment return does 
not satisfy the statutory requirements of a return, often assesses the frivo-
lous return penalty9 or criminally prosecutes the claimant for failure to 
file a return.1O Further difficulty for fifth amendment claims has been 
created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision that the 
contents of a taxpayer's voluntarily prepared business records are not 
1. I.R.C. § 6072(a) (1982). When a taxpayer follows a fiscal year rather than a calen-
dar year, the return generally is due on the fifteenth day of the fourth month follow-
ing the close of the fiscal year. Id. The Secretary, however, may grant a reasonable 
extension of time for filing any return. I.R.C. § 6081(a) (1982). 
2. I.R.C. § 601l(a) (1982). 
3. See, e.g., Gamer v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976). 
4. I.R.C. § 7206 (1982); 18 U.S.c. § 1001 (1982). 
5. I.R.C. § 7203 (1982). 
6. See United States v. Egan, 459 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1972). See generally Note, Internal 
Revenue Form 1040 and the Fifth Amendment: Self-Reporting or Self-Incrimina-
tion, the Taxpayer's Dilemma, 54 N.D.L. REV. 213 (1977). 
7. The fifth amendment provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
8. For other methods of invoking the fifth amendment's protection, see generally infra 
notes 206-314 and accompanying text. 
9. I.R.C. § 6702 (1982). 
10. I.R.C. § 7203 (1982). 
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protected by the fifth amendment. II 
This comment provides a framework for compliance with the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (lRC) that preserves a taxpayer's constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination and avoids commission of additional 
criminal acts. This comment begins by discussing the IRC sections and 
Supreme Court decisions integral to a resolution of the taxpayer's 
trilemma. This comment then develops a framework for determining the 
validity of a taxpayer's fifth amendment claim and reviews the standards 
used to determine whether a disclosure incriminates a taxpayer of a non-
tax crime, tax crime, or state law crime. Various methods of exercising 
the fifth amendment privilege are then analyzed, and special attention is 
given to the disclosure of a taxpayer's identity, occupation, exemptions, 
and amount of income. Finally, the impact of the Supreme Court's re-
cent United States v. Doe 12 decision on taxpayers' fifth amendment 
claims is examined. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Internal Revenue Code and the Fifth Amendment 
Under its constitutional taxing power, Congress enacted the IRC. 
The IRC requires individuals to file an annual income tax return, I3 dis-
close information on income tax forms,14 and keep supporting records 
available for IRS inspection. IS Enforcement of these IRC requirements 
is accomplished through a myriad of provisions that empower the gov-
ernment to assess penaltiesl6 and bring criminal charges against viola-
torsY The most frequently prosecuted tax crimes are: (1) willful 
attempt to evade tax (tax fraud or tax evasion);18 (2) willful failure to file 
a return or pay tax (failure to file);19 and, (3) willful making of a false 
11. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
12. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
13. I.R.C. §§ 6012, 6072 (1982). Individuals with gross income of less than $1,000 are 
exempt from the filing requirement. Threshhold amounts greater than $1,000 are 
applicable to specified individuals. I.R.C. § 6012(1)(A)(i)-(iii), (1)(B) (1982). 
14. 1.R.c. § 601l(a) (1982). 
IS. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) & (e) (1982). 
16. E.g., I.R.C. § 6702 (1982). 
17. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. See generally CRIMINAL SECTION, 
TAX DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL (1986). 
18. Section 7201 provides: 
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any 
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other 
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000, ... or imprisoned not more 
than 5 years, or both, together with costs of prosecution. 
1.R.c. § 7201 (1982). 
19. Section 7203 provides: 
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or 
required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to 
make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully 
fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such 
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return, statement, or other document under the penalties of perjury (false 
statement).20 The Supreme Court has defined the willfulness element of 
these crimes as "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal 
duty."21 
The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."22 Although typically 
considered to provide protection against testifying at trial, the privilege 
against self-incrimination also applies to information revealed in the 
preparation and filing of an income tax return because it is testimonial in 
nature.23 Thus, the IRC conflicts with the fifth amendment when a tax-
payer is directed to disclose incriminating information on an income tax 
return. 
Although not as broad as the fifth amendment, IRC section 6103 
(section 6103) provides limited protection for disclosures made on an in-
come tax return. Federal and state officials24 may disclose federal tax 
returns or tax return information25 only as provided by section 6103. 26 
The section permits disclosures to federal employees for use in federal 
criminal investigations,27 and to federaps or state29 officials for adminis-
tering their tax laws. The statute does not, however, permit state officials 
to use disclosures for non tax criminal investigations. 30 
records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law 
or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not 
more than $25,000, ... or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, 
together with the costs of prosecution. 
I.R.C. § 7203 (1982). 
20. Section 7206 provides in part: 
Any person who -
(1) Declaration under penalties of perjury. - Willfully makes and 
subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is 
verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of per-
jury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every 
material matter; .... 
I.R.C. § 7206 (1982); see also 18 U.S.c. § 1001 (1982). 
21. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (quoting United States v. Bishop, 
412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973». 
22. U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
23. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 655-56. 
24. 1.R.c. § 6103(a)(I)-(2) (1982). 
25. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(I)-(3) (1982). 
26. Act of Oct. 28,1919, ch. 85,41 Stat. 305. 
27. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(I) (1982). For a discussion of the ex parte reasonable cause show-
ing required, see Comment, Raiding the Confessional - The Use of Income Tax 
Returns in Nontax Criminal Investigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1273-80 
(1980). The author's basic premise, that compelled tax information is entitled to the 
same protection as the private papers in one's home, is subject to considerable ques-
tion after Doe, 465 U.S. 605. 
28. I.R.C. § 6103(h) (1982) (no showing required). 
29. l.R.C. § 6103(d)(I) (1982). 
30. Id. Disclosure is permitted only to the extent necessary for administration of the 
state's tax law. I.R.C. § 6103(d)(2) (1982). 
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B. Supreme Court Analysis 
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue 
of self-incrimination in the context of filing a federal income tax return. 
In United States v. Sullivan,31 an individual convicted of failure to file a 
tax return32 argued that requiring a federal income tax return from some-
one who had violated a federal law conflicts with the fifth amendment.33 
The individual also argued that the IRC is not intended to tax income 
derived from criminal activity.34 The Court held that income derived 
from illegal activity is subject to income tax and that the fifth amendment 
did not protect the taxpayer from the requirement of filing an income tax 
return. 35 The Court reasoned that a taxpayer could claim the fifth 
amendment on a return if the form required disclosures that the defend-
ant was privileged from making, but could not on that account refuse to 
make any return at all. 36 
Because the individual in Sullivan did not file a return, the Court did 
not decide what, if any, information is privileged from disclosure on a 
federal income tax return.37 In dictum, however, the Court noted that 
most of the disclosures would not incriminate and that "[i]t would be an 
extreme if not extravagant application of the fifth amendment to say that 
it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it 
had been made in a crime."38 The Sullivan Court nevertheless suggested 
that a taxpayer could test the fifth amendment's application to a specific 
disclosure by claiming the privilege on his return.39 The Court thus im-
plied that a taxpayer cannot claim the fifth amendment without submit-
ting his claim to legal scrutiny.40 
In 1953, the Court confronted the issue of self-incrimination in the 
context of registering for, and paying, the federal wagering tax. In 
United States v. Kahriger,41 an individual who allegedly violated state 
31. 274 U.S. 259 (1927). 
32. [d. at 262. 
33. [d. at 261. 
34. /d. at 262. 
35. [d. at 263. 
36. [d.; see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 650-51 n.3 (1976) ("[N]othing 
we say here questions the continuing validity of Sullivan's holding that returns must 
be filed."). 
37. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263. The Court expressly noted that it was "not called on to 
decide what information, if any, [Sullivan] might have withheld." [d. at 263. 
38. [d. at 263-64. Justice Holmes also noted that "most items warranted no com-
plaint." Less tolerant of the suggestion that illegal expenses, such as bribes, are 
deductible, Justice Holmes stated that deductibility of illegal expenses does not fol-
low, but the question would be considered "if a taxpayer has the temerity to raise 
it." [d. 
39. [d. at 264. 
40. [d. ("He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter by his own 
declaration that to write any word upon the government blank would bring him into 
danger of the law."). The Court noted that Sullivan did not make a declaration; 
rather, he abstained from filing a return. [d. 
41. 345 U.S. 22 (1953), rev'd, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Two years later, the Court reached 
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gambling laws failed to register for the federal wagering tax. The Court 
held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not protect taxpay-
ers engaged in wagering activities.42 The Kahriger Court questioned 
whether an individual could claim the fifth amendment privilege after 
failing to register for the wagering tax and cited Sullivan for the proposi-
tion that a taxpayer must file a return and claim the privilege thereon.43 
The Court, however, did not find that the wagerer lost the fifth amend-
ment privilege because of a failure to claim the privilege in a timely man-
ner, or because of a failure to claim the privilege on a filed return. 
Instead, the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege applies "only 
to past acts, not to future acts."44 The wagering tax provisions were up-
held because registration does not compel the confession of acts already 
committed, but merely requires the taxpayer to register before engaging 
in the business of wagering.45 
In 1968, the Court in United States v. Marchetti 46 reconsidered the 
fifth amendment's application to a taxpayer who failed to register for, or 
pay, the federal wagering tax and reversed the Kahriger decision. Re-
jecting the chronological fifth amendment analysis applied in Kahriger, 
the Marchetti Court stated that "[t]he question is not whether a taxpayer 
holds a 'right' to violate state law, but whether, having done so, he may 
be compelled to give evidence against himself."47 The Court stated two 
reasons for finding the chronological reasoning in Kahriger deficient.48 
First, Kahriger overlooked the hazards of self-incrimination as to past or 
present acts stemming from registration and payment of the occupational 
tax.49 Second, the fifth amendment's application is determined by 
whether the claimant is confronted with substantial hazards of self-in-
crimination and not by whether a statute requires confession of a crimi-
nal intent before the commission of a criminal act. 50 
Marchetti answered the question left open in Kahriger: can an indi-
vidual claim the fifth amendment privilege after failing to register?51 
Noting that Marchetti could not present his claim to the IRS without 
admitting guilt, the Court held that assertion of the fifth amendment at 
trial is sufficient to avoid losing this constitutional protection. 52 The 
Court reasoned that finding a loss of fifth amendment protection would 
result in widespread erosion of the privilege through ingeniously drawn 
the same result in Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), rev'd, 390 U.S. 39 
(1968), where an individual allegedly violated federal gambling laws. 
42. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 32-33. 
43. !d. 
44.Id. 
45. Id. But see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
46. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
47. Id. at 51. 
48. Id. at 52. 
49. !d. at 52-53. 
50. Id. at 53-54. 
51. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 32. 
52. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50. 
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legislation requiring individuals to cease illegal activities or provide the 
government with incriminating information. 53 
The Court rejected Kahriger's suggestion that Sullivan required the 
filing of a wagering tax return. The Court noted that Sullivan was con-
cerned with an unwarranted extension of the fifth amendment's privilege 
and with the taxpayer becoming the final arbiter of the merits of fjfth 
amendment claims. 54 Application of the privilege to the whole registra-
tion procedure is neither extreme nor extravagant because, unlike the tax 
returns in Sullivan, every wagering requirement directly and unmis-
takeably incriminates the taxpayer. 55 The Court found the policy against 
taxpayers determining the validity of fifth amendment claims unpersua-
sive because requiring the presentation of a taxpayer's claim to the Treas-
ury Department obliges one "to prove guilt to avoid admitting it."56 
After establishing the fifth amendment's application to wagering tax 
returns, the Court analyzed whether Marchetti was confronted with 
"substantial and 'real', and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of 
incrimination."57 The Court concluded that Marchetti was subject to a 
substantial risk of self-incrimination because registration and payment 
significantly increased the likelihood of prosecution for future gambling 
activities. 58 Compliance also provided evidence that Marchetti intended 
to violate gambling laws. 59 
The Marchetti Court proceeded to consider the applicability of the 
required records doctrine. The Court explained that the doctrine con-
sists of three principle elements: (1) the preservation of records customa-
rily kept by the regulated person; (2) the public aspects of the records 
that render them analogous to public documents; and, (3) a governmen-
tal inquiry that is essentially regulatory.60 When the required records 
doctrine applies, the taxpayer impliedly waives the fifth amendment be-
cause he engaged in a regulated activity.61 The Court concluded that the 
required records doctrine did not apply because Marchetti was not re-
quired to keep and preserve records of the type he customarily kept, but 
was required to provide unrelated information similar to providing oral 
testimony. The information required from Marchetti had no public as-
pects, but rather was information known to a private individual. The 
wagering requirements were not imposed in an essentially noncriminal 
53. Id. at 51-52. 
54. Id. at 50. 
55. !d. at 48-49. 
56. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 34). 
57. Id. at 53; see also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1950); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1895). 
58. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 54. 
59. Id. at 52-54. 
60. Id. at 55-57; see also Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67-68. 
61. Id. at 55-57; see also Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 65 COL. L. REV. 681, 687-90 (1965). For a criticism of the required 
records doctrine, see McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. 
CT. REV. 193, 214-32. 
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and regulatory area, but were directed at a group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities.62 The United States suggested the required records 
doctrine was irrelevant because Marchetti was required to submit reports 
rather than maintain them.63 The Court, however, rejected the govern-
ment's distinction, stating that required records "[r]egulations permit 
records to be retained, rather than filed, largely for the convenience of 
the persons regulated."64 
The Marchetti Court refused to place a use restriction on the infor-
mation obtained from a taxpayer who complies with the wagering re-
quirements.65 The Court recognized that imposition of a use restriction 
interfered with the congressional intent to prosecute gamblers.66 Judicial 
application of use immunity would require authorities to show their evi-
dence was not tainted by information obtained from the taxpayer's com-
pliance with the wagering tax requirements.67 The Court concluded that 
Congress should strike the balance between the Treasury Department's 
need for tax information and the government's desire to enforce gam-
bling prohibitions.68 Use immunity thus was not mandated. 
In 1971, the Court addressed the issue of self-incrimination when a 
taxpayer makes incriminating disclosures on a wagering tax return. In 
Mackey v. United States ,69 the taxpayer relied on Marchetti to attack 
collaterally the admission of the amounts of income disclosed on wager-
ing tax returns in his criminal prosecution for income tax evasion.70 A 
majority of the Court held that the fifth amendment does not protect 
against prosecutorial use of disclosures made on gambling tax returns. 
The plurality held that Marchetti had prospective application only, and 
thus Mackey's argument was rejected71 because his conviction became 
final prior to Marchetti. A concurring justice, however, noted that Sulli-
van might excuse reporting the amount of income earned where the 
amount would lead to disclosure of the criminal activities that had pro-
duced the income.72 Mackey, however, was prosecuted for a tax crime, 
not a nontax crime, and therefore Sullivan did not apply.73 
In 1976, the Court addressed the issue of self-incrimination on an 
income tax return where a taxpayer made disclosures rather than claim-
ing the fifth amendment. In Garner v. United States, 74 a taxpayer listed 
his occupation as a professional gambler and reported substantial income 
62. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 56-57. 
63. [d. at 56 n.14. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. at 58. 
66. [d. at 59. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 60. 
69. 401 U.S. 667 (1971). 
70. United States v. Mackey, 401 U.S. 667, 674 (1971). 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 708 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
73. [d. 
74. 424 U.S. 648 (1976). 
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from gambling.75 When prosecuted for conspiracy to fix horse races,76 
Garner unsuccessfully relied on the fifth amendment to prevent the ad-
mission of his tax returns at trial. 77 The returns were admitted into evi-
dence to establish Garner's familiarity with gambling and to rebut his 
claim of an innocent relationship with alleged coconspirators.78 
Although acknowledging that the IRC compels the filing of an income 
tax return,79 the Court noted that instead of claiming the fifth amend-
ment on his tax return, Garner disclosed incriminating information. 80 
The Court therefore reasoned that the government did not compel Gar-
ner to incriminate himself with regard to the specific disclosures made on 
the return. 81 
Relying primarily on three cases, Gamer argued that a taxpayer is 
under compulsion to make incriminating disclosures and should not lose 
fifth amendment protection by disclosing information in his income tax 
return rather than claiming the privilege in the return.82 First, Garner 
cited Miranda v. Arizona 83 for the proposition that a valid waiver of the 
fifth amendment's protection must be knowing and intelligent. 84 In Mi-
randa, the Court excluded statements made by an individual in custody 
because of the psychological pressures of custodial interrogation and the 
government's knowledge of the incriminating nature of the disclosures 
sought.85 Emphasizing a taxpayer's freedom to complete a return at lei-
sure and with legal assistance, the Garner Court rejected Gamer's Mi-
randa argument by distinguishing statements made by an individual in 
custodial interrogation from disclosures made on a noncustodial, unpres-
sured, and not necessarily incriminating income tax return. 86 
Second, Garner argued that Mackey v. United States 87 permitted a 
taxpayer to exclude incriminating information disclosed in a tax return 
by making an objection at trial. 88 The Court, however, rejected Garner's 
argument by distinguishing wagering tax returns from income tax re-
turns.89 The Court stated that the great majority of people do not in-
criminate themselves by filing an income tax return, whereas wagering 
tax returns are directed at individuals "inherently suspect of criminal 
75. Garner, 424 U.S. at 649-50. 
76. See 18 U.S.c. § 224 (1964); 18 U.S.c. § 1084 (1961); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961); 18 
U.S.c. § 371 (1948). 
77. Garner, 424 U.S. at 649. 
78. Id. at 650. 
79. Id. at 652. 
80. /d. at 653. 
81. Id. at 665. 
82. Id. at 656. 
83. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
84. Garner, 424 U.S. at 657. 
85. /d. at 657-58 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 475-76). 
86. Garner, 424 U.S. at 658. 
87. 401 U.S. 667 (1971). 
88. Garner, 424 U.S. at 659. 
89. Id. at 659-60 & n.13 (The Garner Court implied that, under Marchetti, the fifth 
amendment's protection may be exercised only by failing to file.). 
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activities. "90 
Finally, Garner relied on Garrity v. New Jersey,9t which held that 
policemen are denied the freedom to remain silent when their fifth 
amendment claims lead to their dismissal.92 Analogizing to Garrity, 
Garner claimed that the possibility of prosecution for failure to file a 
return, resulting from claiming the fifth amendment on the return, com-
pelled incriminating disclosures on the income tax return.93 Distinguish-
ing these situations, the Court stated that the policemen in Garrity were 
threatened with punishment for a valid exercise of the privilege, whereas 
a conviction for failure to file a tax return cannot be based on a valid 
exercise of the privilege.94 
Although the disclosures in Garner were not compelled, and thus 
not constitutionally protected against admission in subsequent criminal 
proceedings,95 the Court did establish a framework for analyzing the fifth 
amendment's application to the preparation and filing of an income tax 
return.96 First, the Garner Court limited its decision to self-incrimina-
tion under nontax laws.97 Second, the Court stated that "the privilege 
protects against the use of compelled statements as well as guarantees the 
right to remain silent absent immunity."98 Third, the Court noted that 
the privilege applies only when "the Government seeks testimony that 
will subject its giver to criminalliability."99 Fourth, the Court placed the 
burden of making a timely assertion of the privilege on the witness. tOO 
Finally, the Court equated information revealed in the preparation and 
filing of an income tax return with the testimony of a witness. lOt 
In 1984, the Court considered the issue of self-incrimination where a 
taxpayer prepared incriminating business records. In United States v. 
Doe,102 a grand jury investigating municipal corruption issued subpoenas 
demanding a sole proprietor's business records. 103 The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey required disclosure only of 
90. /d. at 660-61. Justice Brennan reasoned that the admission of the amount of income 
from gambling is not protected because the United States is entitled to demand the 
amount of a taxpayer's gross income. [d. at 659 n.12. 
91. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
92. [d. at 497-98. 
93. Garner, 424 U.S. at 661. 
94. [d. at 662. In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall narrowed the issue to whether 
the possibility of a criminal prosecution compels a taxpayer to make incriminating 
disclosures. He would hold that threat of prosecution does not compel incriminat-
ing disclosures because a good faith claim of privilege, albeit erroneous, does not 
expose a taxpayer to criminal liability. /d. at 666. 
95. [d. at 665. 
96. See id. at 656. 
97. [d. at 650-51 n.3. 
98. [d. at 653. 
99. Id. at 655. 
100.Id. 
101. Id. at 656. 
102. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
103. Id. at 606-07. 
536 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency.l04 
The Third Circuit affirmed,105 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to consider the limited issue of the fifth amendment's application to busi-
ness records and documents not required by law to be kept or disclosed 
to a public agency.106 Reasoning that the fifth amendment protects only 
against compelled self-incrimination, the Court held that the contents of 
business records are not privileged because the taxpayer voluntarily 
prepares the documents and the subpoenas do not compel the taxpayer to 
restate or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents. 107 The 
Court, however, upheld the district court's finding that the act of produc-
ing the documents involved testimonial self-incrimination. 108 The court 
reasoned that the act of producing the documents involves testimonial 
self-incrimination because it compels the taxpayer to admit the records 
exist, are in his possession, and are authentic. 109 The government there-
fore cannot compel disclosure without a statutory grant of use immu-
nity.110 As in prior cases, the Court refused to impose use immunity on 
the taxpayer's business records because Congress gave the prosecution, 
rather than the judiciary, the right to balance the need for information 
against the risk that the grant of immunity will frustrate an attempt to 
prosecute the subject of an investigation. II I The Court noted, however, 
that any "grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege 
against self-incrimination."ll2 To satisfy the fifth amendment's require-
ments, a grant of immunity needs only to protect against self-incrimina-
tion resulting from the act of producing the documents and not from the 
documents' contents. Il3 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. When is a Taxpayer's Fifth Amendment Claim Valid? 
The major issues raised when a taxpayer claims the fifth amendment 
is whether the claim is valid, and if not, whether the claim was made in 
good faith. When determining the validity of fifth amendment claims for 
tax purposes, courts generally apply two standards: (1) the substantial 
hazards of self-incrimination test (favorable to the taxpayer); and (2) a 
104. In re Matter of the Grand Jury EmpanneJled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1 
(D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part & reversed in part 
sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
105. 681 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part & reversed in part sub nom. United States 
v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
106. 461 U.S. 913 (1983). 
107. 465 U.S. at 611-12. 
108. Id. at 617 & n.13 (applying the substantial hazards of self-incrimination test). 
109. Id. at 612-14. 
110. Id. at 617. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion states that the fifth amendment 
does not apply to a taxpayer's personal records. /d. at 618. 
Ill. Id. at 616. 
112. Id. at 617 n.17. 
113. Id. 
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weighing or balancing test (unfavorable to the taxpayer). Application of 
these standards to non tax, tax, and state law crimes is discussed. The 
good faith defense to a criminal tax prosecution follows the discussions of 
the different methods of claiming the fifth amendment privilege and pos-
sible waiver of the privilege. 
1. Failure to Disclose Incriminating Information Regarding a Prior 
Federal Nontax Crime 
When determining the validity of a taxpayer's fifth amendment 
claim for information regarding a nontax crime,114 the Supreme Court 
applies the substantial hazards of self-incrimination standard. ll5 Under 
this test, the Court held that disclosures furnishing a link in a chain of 
evidence tending to establish gUilt create a substantial hazard. 116 Simi-
larly, information that provides a "lead" or "clue" also is protected by 
the fifth amendment. ll7 Trifling or imaginary hazards, however, are in-
sufficient to merit fifth amendment protection,llS as are claims that are 
either "extreme" or "extravagant."1l9 
The Supreme Court found substantial hazards of self-incrimination 
when disclosures required on a wagering tax return were admissible as 
evidence in an individual's criminal prosecution.120 In Marchetti, the 
Court expressly found substantial hazards of self-incrimination because 
compliance with wagering tax laws, which required taxpayers to report 
their involvement in accepting wagers, list names and addresses of agents 
and employees, and maintain records indicating daily amounts of gross 
wagers, served as decisive evidence of criminal gambling violations. 121 
Similarly, in Doe, the Court applied the substantial hazards of self-in-
crimination standard where the taxpayer's act of producing business doc-
uments provided evidence of the existence, authenticity, and possession 
114. Garner, 424 U.S. 648, 662-63. "The [f]ifth [a]mendment itself guarantees the tax-
payer's insulation against liability imposed on the basis of a valid and timely claim 
of privilege .... " Id. at 662-63. 
115. See, e.g., Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53 (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 
(1950); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1895». 
116. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48; see also United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 
479 (1951); Hashagen V. United States, 283 F.2d 345,345 (9th Cir. 1960». 
117. United States V. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 
(1980) (citing Hashagen V. United States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960». 
118. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53. 
119. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263; see also Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50 (citing Sullivan, 274 
U.S. at 263). 
120. Although the fifth amendment's protection does not necessarily vary with changes 
in the rules of evidence, the Supreme Court stated that "the priVilege against self-
incrimination may not properly be asserted if other protection is granted which 'is 
so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect' as the privilege itself." 
Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58 (quoting Counselman V. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 
(1891». 
121. Id. at 54. 
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of the documents. 122 For wagering tax returns and business records, the 
Court thus applies the substantial hazards test. 
In Garner, the Court recognized a standard for review of fifth 
amendment claims on income tax returns essentially equivalent to the 
substantial hazards standard. The Garner Court equated disclosures on 
an income tax return with an individual's testimony123 and stated that 
the right to remain silent applies when the "government seeks testimony 
that will subject its giver to criminal liability." 124 In Garner, the Court 
stated that the taxpayer could have claimed the fifth amendment privi-
lege125 instead of listing his occupation as a professional gambler and 
disclosing substantial gambling income. 126 The government introduced 
these disclosures in Garner's prosecution for fixing gambling contests. 127 
Dictum in Sullivan suggests that fifth amendment claims are valid if 
they are neither extreme nor extravagant,128 a standard essentially 
equivalent to the substantial hazards standard. 129 The Sullivan Court, 
however, did not discuss whether the admissibility of required disclo-
sures in a criminal trial resulted in fifth amendment protection for the 
required information. 130 Although the Supreme Court has not adopted a 
test for income tax returns expressly, Garner and Sullivan indicate that 
the substantial hazards of self-incrimination test also applies to income 
tax returns. 
In applying the substantial hazards of self-incrimination standard, 
the Supreme Court has recognized valid reasons for claiming fifth 
amendment protection other than the admissibility of disclosures as di-
rect evidence against an individual in a criminal trial. For example, the 
prosecution in Garner introduced income tax returns to rebut the tax-
payer's testimonial claim of an innocent relationship with other conspira-
tors.131 Similarly, in Marchetti, the Court reasoned that registration for 
the wagering tax significantly enhanced the likelihood of prosecution for 
122. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. 
123. Garner, 424 U.S. at 656. 
124. [d. at 655. 
125. [d. at 653, 665. 
126. [d. at 649-50. After briefly stating the disclosures Gamer made, the Court framed 
the issue by using the term "specific disclosures" instead of listing the disclosures. 
The Court's use of "specific disclosures" apparently refers to Gamer's occupation as 
a professional gambler and the substantial income from gambling. The Court did 
not explain what were the incriminating aspects of the disclosures. The mere fact 
that Garner was a gambler of any sort would seem to be incriminating. Moreover, 
Garner's description of his gambling occupation as being a "professional" may have 
had an additional incriminating effect. Likewise, the disclosure of substantial in-
come probably would have incriminating aspects independent of its gambling 
source. 
127. /d. at 649. 
128. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64. 
129. The Marchetti court used the terms "extreme or extravagant" and "substantial 
hazards of self-incrimination" interchangeably. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 49. 
130. SuI/ivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64. 
131. Garner, 424 U.S. at 650. 
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future acts. J32 The Marchetti Court apparently determined that the gam-
bling information provided a lead or a clue. 133 In reviewing an individ-
ual's fifth amendment claim, therefore, courts should look beyond the 
possible use of a disclosure as direct evidence of a crime and consider the 
broader incriminatory effects of a disclosure. If an individual apparently 
has committed criminal acts, a court should uphold a taxpayer's fifth 
amendment claim when the disclosure would be relevant to an investiga-
tion or prosecution of the crime. 
2. Failure to Disclose Incriminating Information Regarding a Prior 
Federal Tax Crime 
In United States v. Carison,134 an individual claimed ninety-nine 
withholding exemptions. 135 Due to the amount of exemptions claimed, 
Carlson's employer did not withhold federal income tax. 136 In addition, 
Carlson failed to make a tax payment with his income tax return. In-
stead, Carlson claimed the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation rather than providing any information from which tax liability 
could be calculated. Carlson also attached tax protestor material to his 
return. Although Carlson was vulnerable to prosecution for supplying 
false withholding information, the government prosecuted Carlson for 
failure to file an income tax return. \37 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged that Carlson faced substantial hazards of self-incrimination and 
recognized the issue presented as the one that the Garner Court expressly 
left open - the standard applicable to self-incrimination for a criminal 
income tax violation. \38 Noting the collision of governmental and indi-
vidual interests, the Ninth Circuit balanced Carlson's fifth amendment 
privilege against the government's need for revenue collection through 
self-reporting. 139 After finding Carlson's fifth amendment claim part of 
an overall plan to evade taxes,l40 the court stated that the privilege 
against self-incrimination did not compel protection of Carlson's activi-
ties. 141 Stating that taxpayers who employ Carlson's scheme severely 
132. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 54. 
133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Information that significantly enhances 
the likelihood of a future prosecution apparently creates substantial hazards of self-
incrimination. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53-54. In any event, an increased 
probability of prosecution does not fit into the category of admissible evidence. 
134. 617 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980). 
135. Id. at 519; see I.R.C. § n05(a) (1982). 
136. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 519. 
137.Id. 
138. Id. at 523; see also Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 n.3. The Court stated that the claims 
of privilege considered are "only those justified by a fear of self-incrimination other 
than under the tax laws." Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 n.3. 
139. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 521. 
140.Id. 
141. Id. at 523. The court also found that the neutrality of questions on an income tax 
return weighed in favor of requiring the filing of income tax returns. Id. 
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hinder the government's ability to determine tax liability, the court held 
that "an individual who seeks to frustrate the tax laws by claiming too 
many withholding exemptions, with an eye to covering that crime and 
evading the tax return requirement by assertion of the fifth amendment, 
is not entitled to the amendment's protection."142 The court thus sus-
tained Carlson's conviction for failure to file an income tax return. 143 
Furthermore, the court found that Carlson did not claim the fifth amend-
ment in good faith, notwithstanding the substantial hazards of self-in-
crimination he faced. l44 
Although the Ninth Circuit adopted a balancing test for analyzing 
the validity of a taxpayer's fifth amendment claim when invoked to avoid 
self-incrimination of a tax crime, the decision is not supported by case 
law,145 legal commentaries,146 or reason.147 The Carlson balancing test 
142. Id. at 522-23. The court also suggested the crime of claiming too many withholding 
allowances may not be protected by the fifth amendment under any circumstances. 
Id. 
143. !d. at 523. 
144. Id. at 523-24. 
145. Although California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), mentioned balancing the govern-
ment's need with individual rights, the plurality applied the substantial hazards of 
self-incrimination standard along with four dissenters. Id. at 429, 460, 470. Only 
one concurring Justice applied a balancing test. Id. at 427-34, 454 (Harlan, J., con-
curring). Moreover, Byers did not involve a tax return, but rather a statute that 
requires the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to stop at the scene 
and give his name and address. Id. at 425. 
The Carlson court's suggestion that applying the substantial hazards of self-
incrimination test undercut the rule in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 
(1927), requiring an individual to file an income tax return, is difficult to support. 
In Sullivan, the Court required taxpayers to file a tax form even though the fifth 
amendment remains a valid response to specific inquiries. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-
64. In a similar manner, Carlson filed a return with fifth amendment responses for 
specific inquiries. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 519. How application of the substantial 
hazards standard to Carlson undercuts the rule in Sullivan is unclear. 
146. The Carlson court used two quotes from Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict 
Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for In-
formation, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 103, to support propositions completely contrary to 
those of their author. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 521 n.5. The first quotation suggests that 
the only way to absolutely prevent income tax returns from incriminating is to aban-
don their information gathering nature or to engage in a fiction that they do not 
incriminate. Id. The author's statement, however, only applied to a hypothetical 
situation in which individuals with illegal income are exempt from filing a return. 
Mansfield, supra, at 118. In the hypothetical, an individual's failure to file inferred 
involvement in illegal activity. Id. This hypothetical was, however, expressly re-
jected by the Sullivan requirement that one must file a return and claim one's privi-
lege thereon. See Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64; Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-5 I n.3. 
Second, Professor Mansfield's use of a balancing test did not apply to a 
taxpayer providing information on a tax return, as in Carlson. Mansfield, supra, at 
119-20. But see Carlson, 617 F.2d at 521 n.5. To the contrary, the professor ques-
tioned whether the government could require an individual to file a return when 
fifth amendment responses are necessary. Mansfield, supra, at 119-20. In response 
to this question, the Mansfield article suggested application of a balancing test. Id. 
at 120. The author supports a balancing test because otherwise taxpayers, rather 
than officials, determine the validity of fifth amendment claims. !d. 
In direct opposition to the approach taken by Carlson, Professor Mansfield 
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focuses on the government's need to collect revenue, not on the incrimi-
nating aspects of the disclosures for which Carlson had claimed the fifth 
amendment. The court also failed to explain why the government's need 
to collect revenue is greater in tax crime situations than in non tax crime 
situations. 148 
To support the adoption of a balancing test, the Carlson court em-
phasized an increased need for revenue collection through self-reporting 
when a tax crime is involved. 149 The government, however, often pos-
sesses more information to compute one's tax liability when an individual 
claims the fifth amendment for a tax crime rather than a non tax crime. 150 
A taxpayer's employer reports each employee's withholding tax and tax-
warned about the dangers of "weighing competing interests [because] the subtle but 
important values represented by the privilege gradually [would] be lost." [d. at 166. 
Professor Mansfield concluded that the conflict between the individual's privilege 
against self-incrimination and the government's need for information is reduced by 
limiting the use of information to the reason for compelling disclosures and preclud-
ing its use for criminal prosecutions. [d. 
147. Carlson's balancing test is difficult to apply because of conflicting language in the 
court's application of the standard. First, the court states the privilege against self-
incrimination is limited for "only the most substantial" reasons. Carlson, 617 F.2d 
at 521. This language indicates an application of the fifth amendment favorable to 
taxpayer's claims. Further in the decision, however, the court concludes that the 
fifth amendment does not "compel protection of Carlson's actions." [d. at 523. 
This language indicates an application of the fifth amendment extremely unfavora-
ble to taxpayer's claims. The court apparently required Carlson to show a compel-
ling reason for invoking the fifth amendment's protection. 
Although Carlson may be limited to tax evasion schemes, the court broadly 
stated the issue to be whether "the privilege against self-incrimination [can] consti-
tute a defense to a section 7203 prosecution when it is asserted to avoid incrimina-
tion for a past violation of income tax laws." The court's narrow holding, however, 
states "that an individual who seeks to frustrate the tax laws by claiming too many 
withholding exemptions, with an eye to covering that crime and evading the tax 
return requirement by assertion of the [fjifth [a]mendment, is not entitled to the 
amendment's protection." [d. Compare the Supreme Court's statement in 
Marchetti that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and 
imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51. 
148. See Carlson, 617 F.2d at 522-23. When two constitutional provisions conflict, a 
preferred approach might be to: 1) determine the nature of the provisions, e.g., 
governmental power or individual rights; 2) define the limits of the provisions, e.g., 
fifth amendment applies only to "compelled" incrimination; 3) attempt to resolve 
the conflict without reducing a governmental power or individual right; and 4) give 
individual rights preference over governmental power when resolving a conflict that 
must reduce one or the other. 
149. Car/son, 617 F.2d at 522-23. 
150. See United States v. Bank of California, 652 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1980) (upheld trial 
court's finding that forms 1099 were in IRS possession and the trial court's refusal 
to enforce a summons for such forms where there was no testimony that a reason-
able inquiry had failed to locate the forms or that the IRS filing procedures rendered 
the documents inaccessible). But cf United States v. First Nat'l Bank of New 
Jersey, 616 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.) (forms 1099 were not in IRS possession because it 
was impractical for the IRS to locate such forms), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). 
Detection of a non tax crime is easier when the fifth amendment is claimed to 
shield a tax crime. Individuals who claim the fifth amendment for non tax crimes, 
however, usually are involved with or employed by, other individuals who also are 
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able income to the IRS.151 A failure to pay any income tax is obvious 
from the face of a tax return when combined with an employer's report 
indicating that income tax was not withheld. 152 The government can de-
termine an individual's tax liability from the amount of income reported 
by the individual's employer. 153 Employers also are required to disclose 
the identity of any employee who claims more than fourteen withholding 
exemptions. 154 When a taxpayer claims the fifth amendment for the 
amount of income earned in a non tax crime, however, the IRS is unlikely 
to possess any information from which tax liability can be calculated. 155 
Although the Ninth Circuit expressed concern that validating fifth 
amendment claims in Carlson-type situations may affect the tax collec-
tion system adversely, the court did not express clearly the reasons for 
this concern. Even if the court recognized Carlson's fifth amendment 
claim and thereby reversed his conviction for failure to file, Carlson still 
faced potential prosecutions for filing a false withholding statement, fail-
ure to pay tax, tax fraud, tax evasion, and perhaps a number of other 
offenses. 156 Recognizing Carlson's claim, therefore, would have pre-
cluded his prosecution only for one of the several tax crimes he 
committed. 
The Carlson court also failed to distinguish Marchetti, where the 
Supreme Court applied the substantial hazards standard in a case where 
involved in illegal activities. In such cases, the IRS is unlikely to receive any infor-
mation through self-reporting. 
The information the IRS was seeking in Carlson was the taxpayer's claimed 
amount of withholding exemptions. See Carlson, 617 F.2d at 522-23. This informa-
tion could have been obtained from the taxpayer's employer. See I.R.e. § 7609 
(1982); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(f)(2)-I(g) (1982). The IRS evidently did obtain the 
number of withholding exemptions via this route. See Carlson, 617 F.2d at 519. 
151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2 (1982). 
152. Mere failure to file a return does not necessarily mean that one failed to pay one's 
tax liability. One's withholding is often greater than one's tax liability. However, 
when the government knows a taxpayer received sufficient income to require a tax 
payment, the taxpayer's failure to have any tax withheld, or to submit a payment 
with his return, usually indicates a failure to pay one's tax liability. See Carlson, 617 
F.2d 518. 
153. The government receives reports from employers and also receives reports regarding 
partnership, dividend, and interest income. See I.R.e. §§ 6031, 6042,6049 (1982). 
With these reports, the government need only fill out one's tax return. See I.R.e. 
§ 6020(b)(I) (1982); see also Garner, 424 U.S. at 651. 
154. Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(f)(2)-1 (g) (1982). 
155. See supra note 150. 
156. The Carlson court's decision fails to distinguish between the crimes of tax fraud and 
failure to file. See I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (1982). Upholding a conviction for failure 
to file by weighing the government's need to collect revenue is illogical because un-
derpayment of one's tax liability is not an element of a criminal failure to file. Com-
pare 1.R.e. § 7201 (1982) with I.R.C. § 7203 (1982). Underpayment of tax is, 
however, an element of tax fraud. See I.R.C. § 7201 (1982). The court rejected 
Carlson's claim because it was part of an overall plan to evade payment of income 
tax. Carlson, 627 F.2d at 522. The government should have prosecuted Carlson for 
tax fraud rather than failure to file an income tax return. Tax fraud is the more 
serious offense; failure to file would merge into tax fraud; and the fifth amendment 
issue could have been avoided. 
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the taxpayer claimed the fifth amendment to avoid self-incrimination of a 
tax crime. 157 Although Marchetti involved a gambling tax, the govern-
ment's need for revenue collection is the same, irrespective of the type of 
tax involved. 158 Even if the court had recognized a privilege not to dis-
close certain information, such a privilege would not excuse payment of 
one's tax liability.159 
The government can satisfy the need for information through alter-
natives to self-reporting when incriminating information is necessary to 
verify an individual's tax liability. The self-reporting system is merely 
one method by which the government exercises the power to collect 
taxes. l60 Alternatives to self-reporting prevent a collision of the govern-
ment's power to collect tax and an individual's fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination. 161 The government can exercise its power to 
tax through self-reporting,162 voluntary and involuntary disclosures by 
third parties,163 a valid search and seizure,l64 or grants of immunity.l65 
Although some alternatives to self-reporting may impose a substantial 
burden on the government, the burden imposed by the grant of statutory 
immunity is minimal. 
In Garner, the Supreme Court recognized the IRS's power to com-
pel a taxpayer to make disclosures in exchange for immunity.166 The Doe 
Court held that the government cannot compel the production of docu-
ments without a statutory grant of use immunity. 167 When an individual 
has a valid fifth amendment claim, the IRS should pursue one of the 
alternative methods of obtaining information needed to calculate tax lia-
bility.168 In this manner, both the government's and the individual's con-
157. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53-54. 
158. The government may argue that the tax base for income tax is much broader than 
for the wagering tax. The government's need for self-reporting is therefore greater. 
159. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 60. 
160. The sixteenth amendment does not create an absolute power to require self-report-
ing. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58 ("The Constitution of course obliges this Court 
to give full recognition to the taxing powers and to measures reasonably incidental 
to their exercise. But we are equally obliged to give full effect to the constitutional 
restrictions which attend the exercise of those powers."). Cf Garner, 424 U.S. at 
661-65 (fifth amendment protection does not extend to disclosures made under 
threat of criminal prosecution). 
161. But cf Car/son, 617 F.2d 518. 
162. See I.R.C. § 6012 (1982). 
163. See I.R.C. § 7609 (1982). 
164. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
165. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 6002-04 (1982). Although empowered to grant immunity, the gov-
ernment does not utilize this method to obtain tax information. See Garner, 424 
U.S. at 652 n.6; Doe, 465 U.S. at 616 (government orally agreed not to use informa-
tion but refused to follow procedures for granting use immunity). 
166. Garner, 424 U.S. at 652 n.6. 
167. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614-17. 
168. Although requiring self-reporting is more convenient for the government, one 
hardly may argue that the government cannot collect revenue except through self-
reporting given the government's alternatives. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 651 (admin-
istratively complete tax return). 
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stitutional interests are preserved; there is no need to balance the 
government's power against an individual's rights. 169 Application of the 
substantial hazards of self-incrimination standard remains necessary, 
however, to establish the existence of a valid fifth amendment claim. 170 
Limiting Carlson to tax protestor cases would preserve taxpayers' 
fifth amendment rights. Applying Carlson in this manner, however, 
would create two standards for analysis of fifth amendment claims. 171 A 
proper analysis should center on an individual's claim rather than his 
social status or the crime involved. Otherwise, courts are required to 
determine whether the Carlson approach applies when an individual is a 
tax protestor, claims false withholding exemptions, or claims protection 
for other tax crimes. \72 Finding that an individual is a tax protestor is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether information required to be disclosed by 
the IRS compels the individual to incriminate himself. 173 If a taxpayer 
claims false withholding exemptions, requiring certain disclosures is con-
ceded to compel self-incrimination.174 Use of a balancing test only obfus-
cates the issue and creates a double standard - substantial hazards for 
non tax crimes and balancing for judicially selected tax crimes. 175 Estab-
lishing a separate standard by distinguishing between a tax protestor or 
tax crimes and nontax crimes is unfounded. 176 
The Court's limitation of Garner to non tax criminal prosecutions 
evidences reluctance to impose a use immunity on disclosures. The fed-
eral government must balance the need for tax information against the 
frustration of future prosecutions.1 77 Furthermore, a judicially imposed 
use immunity places the burden on the government to show evidence 
169. The Carlson court assumed that whenever two constitutional provisions conflict, 
one must give way to the other. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 521; see supra note 148. A 
taxpayer can avoid self-incrimination by making an undisclosed taxpayer payment, 
if necessary. See G. Crowley & R. Manning, Criminal Tax Fraud - Representing 
the Taxpayer Before Trial 290-91 (Practicing Law Institute 1976) [hereinafter cited 
as Crowley & Manning]. 
170. Establishing the existence of a power or a right is a different issue from whether 
powers and rights already established conflict. 
171. In United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1238-40 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit 
determined that traditional fifth amendment analysis requires inquiries into the sub-
stantial hazard of self-incrimination faced by the taxpayer and inquiries into the 
taxpayer's good faith. Id. Surprisingly, the same Justices decided Carlson. 
172. See supra note 147. 
173. The Carlson court shifts the analysis to the taxpayer's motives rather than the 
hazards of self-incrimination faced by the taxpayer. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 520. The 
taxpayer's motives, however, should be considered when analyzing the taxpayer's 
good faith. 
174. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 522. 
175. But see Car/son, 617 F.2d 518 (applies two standards to analyze fifth amendment 
claims - the substantial hazards and balancing tests). 
176. But cf Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 n.3 (reserved judgment on self-incrimination 
under the tax laws). 
177. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614-17; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-60. But cf Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (state grant of immunity precludes federal 
prosecution). 
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used in a criminal tax prosecution was not obtained through a taxpayer's 
immune disclosures. I78 Garner thus does not stand for the proposition 
that the fifth amendment provides more protection when invoked to 
avoid incrimination of a tax crime rather than of a nontax crime. 
3. Failure to Disclose Incriminating Information and Statutory 
Immunity 
Although a disclosure appears to create substantial hazards of self-
incrimination, statutory protection against governmental use of the dis-
closure may be available. The Supreme Court has held that the federal 
government may compel an individual to disclose incriminating informa-
tion if the individual is granted protection "as broad as the privilege 
against self-incrimination."179 IRC section 6103 provides rules for the 
dissemination of tax return information to federal and state officials, and 
describes the purposes for which these officials may use tax return infor-
mation. When a taxpayer invokes the fifth amendment on a federal in-
come tax return to avoid incriminating himself, the taxpayer must 
determine whether section 6103 provides protection as broad as the tax-
payer's privilege against se1f-incrimination. 180 Two initial determina-
tions are necessary: (1) whether the criminal activity violates state law, 
federal law, or both; and (2) whether the activity violates a tax or nontax 
law. 
When a criminal act violates federal law, section 6103 does not pro-
vide protection as broad as the fifth amendment. 181 Classifying the viola-
tion of federal law as a tax or nontax crime is unnecessary because 
section 6103 does not provide significant protection for either type of 
crime. 182 When an individual's act violates only a state tax law, section 
6103 does not provide any protection because federal income tax returns 
are available to state officials for administering state tax laws, including 
criminal state tax laws. 183 When an individual's act violates only a state 
nontax law, however, section 6103 appears to provide protection against 
disclosure of return information to state prosecutors. 184 Section 6103 ex-
pressly forbids state tax officials from using disclosures on federal income 
tax returns for nontax criminal investigations. 18s There are, however, 
178. Report on Administrative Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, S. Doc. No. 
94-266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 821, 925 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Administrative 
Report]. 
179. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58 (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 
(1892». 
180. There is no evidence that Congress intended § 6103 to provide protection as broad 
as the privilege against self-incrimination. 
181. I.R.C. §§ 6103(h) (1982) (disclosure to federal officials for tax purposes), 6103(i) 
(1982) (disclosure to federal officials for nontax purposes). 
182. Id. 
183. I.R.C. § 6103(d) (1982) (disclosure to state tax officials). 
184. I.R.C. § 6103(d) (1982) (for the purpose of, and only to the extent necessary in, the 
administration of state tax laws). 
185. Id. 
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several reasons why section 6103 does not provide protection as broad as 
the fifth amendment's protection. First, section 6103 does not establish 
an exclusionary rule to prevent state prosecutors from using illegally dis-
closed information. 186 Second, disclosures to state officials are permitted 
in emergency situations. 187 Third, if a state requires an individual to dis-
close information reflected on a federal return or to attach any portion of 
a federal return to a state return, section 6103 does not prohibit disclo-
sure of the information by a state tax officer to a state non tax officer if the 
disclosure is authorized by state law. 188 
4. Failure to Disclose Information and Tax Protestors 
Disclosures are not privileged if a taxpayer claims the fifth amend-
ment to protest the tax system rather than to prevent se1f-incrimina-
tion. 189 Protest material attached to the tax return, testimony of the 
taxpayer's witnesses, and the taxpayer's testimony can be evidence of a 
motive to protest taxes. 190 In addition, courts often review the tax return 
to determine whether an individual made a fifth amendment claim for 
the entire tax return or only in response to specific questions. 191 In up-
holding tax protestors' criminal convictions for failure to file because the 
186. The issue is different when a taxpayer voluntarily discloses information and then 
wants the information excluded from evidence. The issue then becomes a question 
of exclusion after having not remained silent, rather than of the right to remain 
silent from the outset. The issue is also different than the issue arising when the 
government obtains information illegally. If a taxpayer is required to provide in-
criminating information on a tax return, the taxpayer is compelled to be a witness 
against himself. In contrast, when the government makes an illegal search, the tax-
payer is not compelled to be a witness against himself. 
187. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(3)(B)(i) (1982). 
188. I.R.C. § 6103(p)(8)(B) (1982). A taxpayer faces additional difficulties in a state that 
requires taxpayers to attach a copy of their federal tax return with their state tax 
return. If the taxpayer attaches a copy of the federal return, Garner indicates that 
the disclosures are voluntary and beyond the fifth amendment's protection. On the 
other hand, if the taxpayer refuses to attach his federal return or attaches a federal 
return with the incriminating information deleted, the state may subpoena the tax-
payer's federal return. Following the reasoning in Doe, the contents of a withheld 
federal return are prepared voluntarily, and thus unprivileged. The act of producing 
the federal return likewise is unprivileged if the existence, the possession, and the 
authenticity of the return are foregone conclusions. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.l3. 
These three requirements are most likely foregone conclusions if a federal tax re-
turn, with the incriminating information deleted, is attached to a state tax return. 
189. United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 
(1980). In response to Carlson, one commentator noted that Quinn v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955), held that one may assert one's fifth amendment privi-
lege and exercise one's first amendment rights simultaneously. The commentator 
also noted the court's conclusion that Carlson claimed the fifth amendment in bad 
faith contradicted the court's finding that disclosure created substantial hazards of 
self-incrimination. Note, United States v. Neffand United States v. Carlson: Recon-
ciling the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination with the Duty to 
File Tax Returns, 5 G.M.U.L. REV. 247, 257-58 (1982). 
190. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 
(1980). 
191. [d. at 1238. 
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fifth amendment was claimed in bad faith, courts often bypass fifth 
amendment analysis and conclude that a tax return on which a wholesale 
fifth amendment claim is made, and from which tax liability can not be 
calculated, is not a tax return. 192 
At least one United States Court of Appeals has recognized the defi-
ciency in bypassing fifth amendment analysis when the privilege is 
claimed in response to specific questions posed on a tax return. 193 In 
United States v. NeJf,194 the Ninth Circuit required independent fifth 
amendment analysis of the substantial hazards of self-incrimination faced 
by a taxpayer who claimed the fifth amendment in response to more than 
twenty-five questions on an income tax return. 195 Noting that the ques-
tions asked on the income tax return were not obviously incriminating, 
the court required positive disclosure of hidden dangers. 196 Because the 
taxpayer only desired to protest taxes, the court determined that the tax-
payer did not face substantial hazards of self-incrimination and did not 
claim the fifth amendment in good faith.197 
B. Methods of Exercising the Fifth Amendment 
1. Introduction 
The Supreme Court consistently has recognized the government's 
power to collect taxes and has recognized the essential role of tax pay-
ment and return filing in the federal scheme of taxation. 198 As a result, 
the Court often has placed the government in a no-lose situation. The 
Sullivan Court refused to recognize a fifth amendment privilege when 
there was a complete failure to file an income tax return,199 and the Gar-
ner Court permitted disclosures made on an income tax return to be ad-
mitted in the taxpayer's non tax criminal trial.2oo Although Sullivan and 
Garner appear to leave the taxpayer with little protection, the Court nev-
ertheless has recognized the taxpayer's right to claim the fifth amend-
192. Id.; see United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198,201 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1012 (1978). 
193. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 
(1980). 
194. 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). 
195. Id. at 1238-39. 
196. Id. at 1240-41. A taxpayer apparently does not have to explain why answers to 
questions are self-incriminating if the circumstances suggest that they are incrimi-
nating. Because the questions on a return are neutral on their face and are not 
directed at those inherently suspect of criminal activity, however, courts are un-
likely to uphold one's claim without some indication why the taxpayer would be 
incriminated. The policy behind requiring some type of showing is to prevent tax-
payers from becoming the final arbiters of the validity of their claims. Id. at 1239-
41. 
197. Id. at 1240-41 n.6. 
198. See, e.g., Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259. 
199. Id.; see also Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 n.3 ("nothing we say here questions the 
continuing validity of Sullivan's holding that returns must be filed"). 
200. Garner, 424 U.S. 648. 
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ment in response to incriminating questions under the proper 
circumstances.2o I 
In Marchetti, the Court upheld the taxpayer's fifth amendment 
claim as a defense to a prosecution for failure to file or pay tax.202 The 
Court reasoned that every requirement of the wagering tax scheme was 
incriminating.203 Consistent with recognition of the government's power 
to collect taxes, however, Marchetti held that the fifth amendment does 
not permit a taxpayer to avoid tax liability.204 Although the taxpayer 
was not required to incriminate himself by paying the wagering tax, the 
government maintained the power to collect the wagering tax based on 
independently gathered information or through granting the taxpayer 
immunity from the incriminating aspects of paying the wagering tax. 205 
2. Claiming the Fifth Amendment on an Income Tax Return 
That an individual may claim the fifth amendment in response to 
specific disclosures required on an income tax return is well settled. 206 
There remains, however, disagreement over the validity of fifth amend-
ment claims for disclosures other than those approved in Garner and Sul-
livan. 207 Garner may have enhanced this uncertainty by noting that 
some types of information are so neutral that the fifth amendment rarely, 
if ever, protects against their disclosure.208 One major area of disagree-
ment involves the validity of fifth amendment claims in response to ques-
tions concerning the amount of a taxpayer's income.209 
201. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64; Garner, 424 U.S. at 653. 
202. Marchetti, 390 U.S. 39; Grosso, 390 U.S. 62. 
203. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49. 
204. See id. at 60-61. 
205. Id. at 59-61. 
206. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 653; SuI/ivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64. 
207. Compare Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64 (claiming one's privilege instead of disclosing 
the amount of one's income is an extreme and extravagant application of the fifth 
amendment) with United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 148 (2d Cir. 1979) (the 
right to make a valid claim of privilege is available even as to the amount of a 
taxpayer's income), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980). Some courts simply reject the 
fifth amendment's application to certain types of disclosures. Although the fifth 
amendment may not protect against certain disclosures, this conclusion should re-
sult from a finding that the disclosure does not create substantial hazards of self-
incrimination. Separating disclosures into types in this comment serves to identify 
the hazards of self-incrimination that may result from certain types of disclosures. 
There is no implication that certain types of disclosures are more incriminating than 
others. This author takes the position that all types of disclosures are incriminating 
under certain circumstances. 
208. Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 n.3 (citing California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971». 
Garner does not refer to the substantial hazards of self-incrimination standard. The 
Garner Court, however, fully recognized the fifth amendment's applicability to dis-
closures on income tax returns. Id. at 649-54. 
209. See United States v. Perkins, 746 F.2d 705,710 (11th Cir. 1984) (tax protestor-
§ 7203 prosecution - fifth amendment does not protect the amount of one's income 
from disclosure); United States v. Turk, 722 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(apparent tax protestor - § 7203 prosecution - fifth amendment not applicable to 
income, citing Sullivan), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 86 (1984); United States v. Schiff, 
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a. Occupation 
The instructions for filing form 1040 are silent regarding the disclo-
sure of a taxpayer's occupation.210 There is, however, little doubt that a 
taxpayer may claim the fifth amendment instead of disclosing an incrimi-
nating occupation.211 Sullivan suggests that a taxpayer's occupation is 
privileged, and Garner reinforces the fifth amendment's application to a 
taxpayer's occupation.212 
When a taxpayer has both a legal and illegal occupation, there is 
uncertainty whether disclosure of only the legal occupation satisfies the 
reporting requirement.213 Because form 1040 requires disclosure of oc-
cupation in the singular,214 disclosure of a taxpayer's primary occupation 
should satisfy the reporting requirement. If the taxpayer's primary occu-
pation is illegal, the taxpayer must disclose that occupation or proffer a 
fifth amendment response.21S A taxpayer should not be required to dis-
612 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (tax protestor - a taxpayer can comply with the tax 
laws and exercise the fifth amendment by listing the amount, not the source, of 
income from illegal sources); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir.) (tax 
protestor - § 7203 prosecution - amount not protected), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
917 (1979); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1310 n.3, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(tax protestor - § 7203 prosecution - amount not protected - the jury instruc-
tion stated income from criminal activities is protected); United States v. Oliver, 505 
F.2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1974) (narcotics violation - § 7201 prosecution - amount 
not protected - taxpayer cites MarchettI); United States v. Mirelez, 496 F.2d 915 
(5th Cir.) (omission of gross income from sale of heroin - § 7206 prosecution -
rejected fifth amendment claim quoting Sullivan), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 
(1974); Bershesky v. Commissioner, 46 TCM 906, 909-10 (1983) (professional gam-
bIer - § 7203 prosecution - source protected - amount unprotected). But see 
United States v. Green, 757 F.2d 116, 122 (7th Cir. 1985) (tax protestor - § 7203 
prosecution - amount of income protected if disclosure may lead to criminal prose-
cution - compare with Oliver above); United States v. Con forte, 692 F.2d 587 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (not tax protestor - § 6211(a) - not as strict when taxpayer makes 
legitimate claim); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (not 
tax _protester - narcotics prosecution - right to make claim of privilege as to 
amount of taxpayer's income, citing Sullivan), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); 
United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (narcotics sales - § 7206 
prosecution - source and amount of income protected if disclosure tends to incrim-
inate, citing Garner). 
210. Dept. of Treas., I.R.S., Package X, Informational Copies of Federal Tax Forms at 
24-25 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Package X). 
211. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64. 
212. Garner, 424 U.S. at 650. 
213. For example, a fisherman may make a living primarily from fishing but also may 
receive compensation for smuggling activities. 
214. Package X, supra note 210, at 19. The instructions require disclosure of "your oc-
cupation(s) in the spaces in the upper right corner." [d. at 25. The use of the plural 
option for occupation, however, seems to apply when married individuals file a joint 
return, and each spouse must disclose an occupation. The form provides one space 
for your occupation and one space for your spouse's occupation. 
215. See I.R.C. § 6011 (1982); Package X, supra note 210, at 19 ("Your Occupation"'). 
Determination of one's primary occupation creates substantial problems. If a fisher-
man only engages in smuggling activity several times in one year, then based on the 
time spent on each occupation, one could reasonably conclude that fishing was the 
taxpayer's primary occupation. However, if one analyzes the gross receipts from 
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close or proffer a fifth amendment response for either a legal or an illegal 
secondary occupation. Reporting a secondary legal occupation, how-
ever, instead of a primary illegal occupation, may expose the taxpayer to 
prosecution for filing a false statement.216 Two considerations make the 
success of such a prosecution unlikely. First, form 1040 requires disclo-
sure of a taxpayer's occupation, not occupations. Second, determination 
of a taxpayer's primary occupation may vary depending upon which fac-
tors are controlling in that determination.217 Both considerations make 
it difficult for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the taxpayer intentionally violated a known legal duty.2ls 
b. Exemptions 
Whether the fifth amendment protects against disclosure of the 
amount of an individual's exemptions is unclear.219 Perhaps the only le-
gitimate reason for claiming the fifth amendment, instead of disclosing 
the amount of one's exemptions, is that the taxpayer already has claimed 
too many withholding exemptions fraudulently.220 In that circumstance, 
if the individual discloses the proper amount of exemptions and pays the 
tax due, a criminal prosecution is unlikely. If the individual claims the 
fifth amendment and refuses to give the IRS any information from which 
tax liability can be calculated, however, the individual faces a variety of 
criminal charges in addition to failing to file a return, even if the court 
finds the fifth amendment claim is valid. 221 
When an individual claims the fifth amendment instead of disclosing 
the correct amount of exemptions or providing any information from 
which tax liability can be calculated, a court should apply the substantial 
hazards test and recognize the validity of the claim. Recognition of the 
fifth amendment privilege merely prevents a prosecution for failure to file 
a return.222 Once an individual's fraudulent scheme is discovered, the 
government can prosecute for the false withholding statement, tax fraud, 
each activity, the illegal activity may appear to be the taxpayer's primary occupa-
tion. Moreover, one's illegal activities may not even constitute an occupation. 
216. I.R.C. § 7206 (1982). 
217. See supra note 215. 
218. See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976). 
219. See Carlson, 617 F.2d 518. In Carlson, the Ninth Circuit held that the fifth amend-
ment is not available when claimed as part of a scheme to evade paying one's tax 
liability. Carlson, 617 F.2d at 523. The Carlson decision, however, may apply only 
to a very narrow set of circumstances. See supra notes 134-78 and accompanying 
text for the standard of self-incrimination that may apply to prior tax crimes. 
220. If one claims the fifth amendment in the box provided on form 1040 instead of the 
number of one's exemptions, there are very few underlying crimes that would sup-
port such a claim. The most obvious crime is overstating one's exemptions. See 
Carlson, 617 F.2d 518; I.R.C. § 7205 (1982). 
221. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7205 (1982). Although Carlson claimed ninety-nine withholding 
exemptions, fewer exemptions also would have resulted in no tax being withheld. 
Therefore, all the IRS would know when looking at one's return is that one claimed 
an amount of exemptions large enough to preclude withholding. 
222. Carlson was prosecuted for failure to file rather than tax fraud or filing a false with-
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and a variety of other crimes.223 There can be little objection to preclu-
sion of prosecution for failure to file when the taxpayer has filed a return 
and has claimed the fifth amendment instead of disclosing information 
that presented substantial hazards of self-incrimination.224 Any deterrent 
effect criminal prosecutions may have is maintained by prosecution for 
providing false withholding exemptions or other tax crimes. By recogniz-
ing a taxpayer's fifth amendment claim, courts avoid the fiction that a 
taxpayer failed to file a return. In addition, courts avoid the inconsis-
tency of applying a balancing test for tax crimes and the substantial 
hazards of self-incrimination test for other crimes. 
c. Income - amount, nature, and source 
Proper disclosure of income requires a taxpayer to reveal the na-
ture,225 the amount,226 and often the source227 of his income. One 
method of determining whether a disclosure creates substantial hazards 
of self-incrimination is to determine whether the disclosure would be ad-
missible against the taxpayer in a criminal trial. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 401 requires that evidence proffered tend to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an action more 
probable than without the evidence.228 A disclosure that an individual 
derived income in an undisclosed amount and from an undisclosed 
source makes it probable that the individual is involved in an illegal busi-
ness. Disclosure of substantial income without a legitimate source also 
makes involvement in an illegal activity more probable than without the 
disclosure. A taxpayer therefore must analyze the incriminating aspects 
of disclosing the nature, amount, and source of his income. 
There are a variety of circumstances in which disclosure of the na-
ture of an individual's income is incriminating. Disclosure of member-
holding statement. See Carlson, 617 F.2d at 520 n.3 (the government conceded 
Carlson could be prosecuted under I.R.e. § 7205). 
223. See, e.g., 1.R.e. § 7206 (1982). 
224. See Neff, 615 F.2d at 1238-39 (reliance upon the definition of a tax return is inap-
propriate because it lacks independent fifth amendment analysis). But cf Carlson, 
617 F.2d at 523 n.6 (the fifth amendment may never protect against claiming too 
many withholding allowances because of the character and urgency of the tax laws). 
Interestingly, the same three-judge panel decided Carlson and Neff. 
225. The nature and type of a taxpayer's income is disclosed when an individual places a 
number or fifth amendment response on form 1040 in response to one of the income 
categories. The nature of a taxpayer's income also is disclosed by attaching sched-
ules that are required for certain types of income such as dividend, interest, or part-
nership income. See Package X, supra note 210, at 73-74, 79. 
226. Disclosure of the amount of an individual's income is accomplished by placing a 
number on the line for total income. See !d. at 19, lines 7-22. 
227. The source of a taxpayer's income is disclosed by informing the government from 
whom income is derived. For example, Schedule E (Form 1040) requires disclosure 
of the name and employer identification number of a partnership from which in-
come is derived. See /d. at 80, Part II, column (a). Many of the incriminating 
aspects of disclosing the nature and source of one's income are analogous to the 
incriminating aspects of disclosing one's occupation. 
228. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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ship in a partnership sometimes suggests conspiratorial involvement.229 
If an individual involved in an illegal business discloses that income is 
derived from a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation, the dis-
closure is admissible to substantiate a prosecutor's claim that the individ-
ual was involved in an illegal business.23o 
Different schedules are required for certain types of income. If a 
taxpayer believes that disclosing the nature of his income is privileged, 
attaching income schedules claiming the fifth amendment likewise would 
incriminate the taxpayer. The hazards of self-incrimination created by 
filing supplementary schedules are similar to those of filling in a specific 
income line on form 1040 because the mere claiming of the fifth amend-
ment privilege on a schedule or income line discloses the nature of a 
taxpayer's income. 
A taxpayer may try to disclose the nature of illegal income in a man-
ner that avoids raising suspicion.231 For example, an individual deriving 
income from an illegal activity may describe the income's nature as mis-
cellaneous or sales.232 Although this approach avoids the attention given 
to a tax return that claims the fifth amendment, such a disclosure exposes 
an individual to a false statement prosecution.233 Moreover, such a vol-
untary disclosure creates substantial hazards of self-incrimination be-
cause it allows a prosecutor in a future criminal trial to challenge the 
taxpayer to bring forth witnesses that will rebut the prosecution's theory 
that the miscellaneous income was derived from illegal activity.234 If the 
nature of a taxpayer's income is incriminating, a taxpayer should invoke 
the fifth amendment either by claiming the fifth amendment, or by dis-
closing the amount of the taxpayer's income from illegal activity, on the 
line for total income. Before disclosing the amount of an individual's 
income, however, the incriminating aspects of disclosing that amount re-
quire analysis. 
Perhaps the most common reason for claiming the fifth amendment, 
rather than disclosing the amount of a taxpayer's income, is to prevent 
229. Cf Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 (conspiratorial involvement). 
230. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 148 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 
(1980). A different result would occur if only a defendant has evidence to contradict 
the prosecutor's claim. [d. Given the reasoning in Barnes, however, a court is un-
likely to find that only a defendant possesses information to contradict the govern-
ment's theory. 
231. See Package X, supra note 210, at 73-75, 77, 79, 81. 
232. See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 146-47. 
233. See United States V. DiVarco, 343 F.Supp. 101 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (income reported as 
commissions paid by corporation, when no commission was ever paid); aff'd, 484 
F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1973). Most likely, a description that is not false will result only 
in a voluntary disclosure of the description. See Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
234. See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 146-47. A constitutional challenge will prevail "if either the 
defendant alone has the information to contradict the government evidence referred 
to or the jury 'naturally and necessarily' would interpret the summation as a com-
ment on the failure of the accused to testify." United States V. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 
199 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977). 
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disclosure of income derived from illegal activity.235 In criminal trials, 
courts admit evidence concerning the sudden acquisition of large 
amounts of income because it is probative of involvement in illegal activ-
ity in which pecuniary gain is the usual motive.236 After the Sullivan 
dictum, refusing to disclose one's income became an extreme, if not ex-
travagant, application of the fifth amendment,237 Garner, however, indi-
cates that the fifth amendment protects against disclosure of a substantial 
amount of income earned from gambling.238 The Court found that the 
taxpayer's professional occupation and substantial income were intro-
duced to establish that Garner did not have an innocent relationship with 
other conspirators.239 The Court then turned to the issue of whether 
Garner waived his privilege with regard to the specific disclosures made 
when he could have claimed the fifth amendment.240 
The Garner Court identified two disclosures and then stated that the 
taxpayer was privileged to claim the fifth amendment for the "specific 
disclosures made."241 The Court apparently assumed both of Garner's 
disclosures were protected by the fifth amendment. The Court noted 
that the case did not present an occasion for deciding what types of infor-
mation were rarely, if ever, protected.242 If the taxpayer's disclosures 
were not protected, the Court would not have framed the issue as 
whether the government compelled the taxpayer "to incriminate himself 
with regard to specific disclosures made on his return when he could 
have claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege instead."243 Finally, if the 
Court intended to avoid the issue of the fifth amendment's application to 
the taxpayer's income, the Court would have reserved its opinion 
expressly. 
Courts have cited Garner to support opposing positions on the fifth 
amendment's applicability when the fifth amendment is invoked to pro-
tect against disclosing the amount of one's income.244 When deciding tax 
protestors' fifth amendment claims for the amount of their income, few 
courts even acknowledge that the fifth amendment applies to the amount 
of a taxpayer's income. 245 Instead of analyzing the hazards of self-in-
crimination faced by tax protestors, courts bypass fifth amendment anal-
235. The cases indicate that income from illegal activity, see, e.g., Garner, 424 U.S. 648, 
and past tax crimes, see, e.g., Car/son, 617 F.2d 518, are the main reasons for claim-
ing the fifth amendment on an income tax return. 
236. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 146-47. 
237. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64. 
238. Garner, 424 U.S. at 649-50. 
239. [d. at 650. 
240. [d. at 652-53. 
241. [d. 
242. [d. at 650-51 n.3. 
243. [d. at 653. 
244. See supra note 209. 
245. [d. 
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ysis by finding the amount of a taxpayer's income unprivileged.246 In 
cases not involving tax protestors, however, courts acknowledge that the 
fifth amendment applies to a taxpayer's claim for the amount of his in-
come.247 The conflicting decisions on the fifth amendment's application 
to the amount of one's income are reconcilable because taxpayers claim-
ing the fifth amendment solely to protest taxes generally do not face sub-
stantial hazards of self-incrimination in regard to the amount of their 
income.248 
Disclosing the source of a taxpayer's income may incriminate the 
taxpayer. For instance, identifying individuals who are associated with 
the taxpayer's income producing activities may inform the government of 
the taxpayer's coconspirators.249 If an individual discloses that he re-
ceived dividends from a specific corporation, the IRS can subpoena the 
corporation's records to determine the amount of stock owned by the 
taxpayer.250 The stock may have been acquired with unreported income 
or with income indicating other illegal conduct.25\ Disclosing the sale of 
assets likewise may reveal that an individual's net worth is unsupported 
by the amount of income declared in prior years. 
d. Identity: Name, Address, and Social Security Number 
Personal identification may raise hazards of self-incrimination 
whether a taxpayer's name, address, or social security number is dis-
closed.252 In l!aird v. Koerner,253 the IRS brought an action to compel 
an attorney to disclose the identity of a client who employed the attorney 
to make an undisclosed taxpayer payment. The Ninth Circuit held that a 
client's identity is privileged under the attorney-client privilege when the 
substance of an incriminating communication is known and the client is 
unknown.254 The court reasoned that identification of the client would 
convey information ordinarily within the privilege.255 The only method 
of preserving the privilege is to protect the client's identity.256 
Likewise, the IRS can ascertain whether a taxpayer has filed an in-
246. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 585 F.2d 573,574 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 
U.S. 928 (1979). 
247. See, e.g., Barnes, 604 F.2d at 147-48. 
248. See Neff, 615 F.2d at 1238-41. 
249. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 (conspiratorial involvement). 
250. See I.R.C. § 7609 (1982). 
251. The net worth method could be used to determine the amount of income earned by 
the taxpayer. See generally Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1955). 
252. This author analyzes one's name, address, and social security number together be-
cause all identify the taxpayer. 
253. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). 
254. [d. at 631-32. The four exceptions to the general rule are: 1) the client voluntarily 
subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court; 2) an identification relating to an 
employment by some third person, not the client or his agent; 3) employment of an 
attorney with respect to future criminal or fraudulent transactons; and 4) the attor-
ney himself being a defendant in a criminal matter. 
255. [d. at 632. 
256. [d. at 633. 
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come tax return. If one files a late return, the IRS knows that the tax-
payer did not file when required. 257 Revealing one's name on the late 
return allows the IRS to identify the taxpayer who failed to file a timely 
return. Sending the IRS a delinquent tax return that identifies a taxpayer 
thus creates substantial hazards of self-incrimination for failing to file a 
timely income tax return. In such a situation, the IRS is not under an 
obligation to refrain from prosecution.258 
If a delinquent tax return discloses a tax deficiency, a taxpayer may 
have incriminated himself for tax fraud. 259 A taxpayer should analyze 
each disclosure carefully even though the taxpayer takes the position that 
his name is privileged.260 For example, a court may find the taxpayer's 
identity is not privileged and the voluntary disclosures are admissible, 
along with the taxpayer's name, as evidence of a failure to file or of tax 
fraud. The government also may provide immunity from a failure to file 
prosecution to obtain the taxpayer's name, and then use the taxpayer's 
voluntary disclosure of a tax deficiency to prosecute for tax fraud. 261 On 
the other hand, if the taxpayer decides to make a "voluntary disclosure," 
then the taxpayer should disclose as much information as possible. The 
purpose behind full disclosure is to negate the government's proof of will-
fulness, which is needed to establish an intentional failure to file. 262 
3. Failing to File a Return 
Sullivan and Garner established the general rule that an individual 
must file income tax returns. 263 Marchetti, however, held that the fifth 
amendment protects an individual from prosecution for failure to file a 
wagering tax return.264 Income tax returns have been distinguished from 
257. The situation may be different when a taxpayer fails to file a return at all for prior 
years and then timely files one for the current year. The IRS is not notified neces-
sarily thereby that the taxpayer did not file for the previous years. The sophistica-
tion of IRS computers, however, may make notification of the past failures 
automatic eventually. Depending on the disclosures for the current year, it may be 
fairly obvious that returns were required in the prior years. Moreover, a taxpayer 
may face substantial hazards of self-incrimination by merely filing after years in 
which the taxpayer filed to file. 
258. R. FINK, TAX FRAUD § 14.03 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1980). 
259. See 1.R.c. § 7201 (1982). 
260. The importance of analyzing each disclosure should not be overlooked. One cannot 
stop analyzing the disclosures when it appears that they will not be incriminating by 
themselves. A later finding that some claims are invalid could change the incrimi-
nating aspects of disclosures made on the assumption of the privileged character of 
other disclosures. 
261. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17 (to satisfy the requirements of the fifth amendment, a 
grant of immunity need only be as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination). 
If the government grants immunity from prosecution for failure to file a return, the 
government may then try to prosecute the taxpayer for other crimes the taxpayer 
voluntarily revealed evidence of on the return, such as gambling, narcotics, or other 
crimes for which pecuniary gain is the motive. 
262. I.R.C. § 7203 (1982). 
263. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64; Garner, 424 U.S. at 650-51 n.3. 
264. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 60-61. 
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wagering tax returns on the ground that federal income tax returns are 
not directed at a group inherently suspect of criminal activity.265 Most 
courts therefore conclude that the fifth amendment cannot protect a tax-
payer against filing an income tax return because the return is not di-
rected at those inherently suspect of criminal activities.266 
Unfortunately, this conclusion avoids analysis of the hazards of self-in-
crimination faced by taxpayers involved in criminal activity. The 
Marchetti Court found gamblers to be a group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities because every requirement of the wagering tax return 
required self-incrimination.267 Similarly, if every aspect of filing an in-
come tax return is incriminating, a taxpayer should be privileged from 
filing an income tax return.268 A taxpayer's failure to satisfy the "inher-
ently suspect of criminal activity" standard in the same manner as a 
gambler should not preclude the fifth amendment's protection. 
To determine whether every aspect of filing a return incriminates a 
taxpayer, the incriminating effect of disclosing one's occupation,269 in-
come,270 and identity must be determined.271 Because an income tax re-
turn requires disclosures regarding income, many individuals will be 
incriminated of a crime motivated by economic gain.272 In such cases, 
the taxpayer's occupation and income usually are privileged. The major 
issue thus is whether disclosure of the taxpayer's identity creates substan-
tial hazards of self-incrimination.273 If the courts refuse to find fifth 
amendment protection for a taxpayer's identity, a taxpayer must file a 
return that discloses his identity and informs the government of involve-
ment in an illegal occupation motivated by economic gain. 
The hazards of self-incrimination created by filing a fifth amend-
ment return that discloses a claimant's identity depend upon the limits 
placed on the government's use of the taxpayer's identity.274 Section 
265. See, e.g., Garner, 424 U.S. at 658-61. 
266. /d. at 659-61. 
267. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49. 
268. Wagering being an occupation inherently suspect of criminal activity, every aspect 
of the wagering tax requirements is incriminating. Although Marchetti does not 
discuss whether the government would accept a return that did not identify the 
taxpayer, nonidentification is also incriminating. 
269. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 225-51 and accompanying text. 
271. See generally supra notes 252-62 and accompanying text. 
272. Income tax returns generally do not elicit information regarding crimes such as 
murder or rape. Income tax returns elicit economic information and, therefore, 
crimes in which taxpayers intend to make a profit are the crimes about which in-
come tax returns require disclosures. 
273. Other disclosures such as a taxpayer's exemptions, see supra notes 210-24 and ac-
companying text, are not considered at this point. Although such disclosures may 
not create substantial hazards of self-incrimination, disclosing such incidental items 
dos not prevent a taxpayer from making an undisclosed taxpayer fifth amendment 
claim. 
274. The government must provide protection as broad as the fifth amendment's protec-
tion before a taxpayer is required to disclose incriminating information. See 
Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58. 
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6103 does not preclude use of tax information for federal criminal inves-
tigations.275 The IRS volunteers the identity of taxpayers suspected of 
criminal activity by sending a taxpayer's name to the Department of Jus-
tice noting that the IRS may have incriminating information regarding 
the taxpayer.276 The Department of Justice may request the taxpayer's 
return and make him the target of a strike force.277 From the return, the 
Department of Justice is provided the identity of a potentially unknown 
criminal and learns that the taxpayer may be involved in a crime moti-
vated by economic gain. A return disclosing a taxpayer's identity but 
claiming the fifth amendment for the taxpayer's occupation and income 
therefore falls within the definition of what constitutes a substantial haz-
ard of self-incrimination278 because a taxpayer may become the target of 
a strike force due to filing a fifth amendment return.279 
In this situation, the incriminating information provided on an in-
come tax return is similar to the incriminating information provided by a 
gambling tax return.280 The only difference is that filing a gambling tax 
return reduces the categories of crimes a taxpayer may have committed 
to gambling related offenses.281 This difference, however, should not pro-
duce a result different than the one in Marchetti. As in Marchetti, tax-
payers reasonably can expect that filing a fifth amendment income tax 
return will "significantly enhance the likelihood of their prosecution for 
future acts. "282 
Failing to file income tax returns allows taxpayers to determine the 
validity of their own fifth amendment claims. Consequently, courts 
strain to invalidate fifth amendment claims that are made in lieu of filing 
a return.283 The Sullivan Court rejected the fifth amendment's applica-
tion to the filing of an income tax return and stated that the taxpayer 
"could not on [the account of a return requiring incriminating answers] 
275. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(I) (1982). 
276. See Administrative Report, supra note 178, at 913-15. The author states that the 
combined intelligence system, in which tax returns became inextricably entangled, 
comprises the most essential feature of the strike force operation. Id. at 903. 
277. /d. at 913. 
278. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48. 
279. For a discussion of the historical background of strike forces see Administrative 
Report, supra note 178, at 900-13. 
280. Although income tax returns are not directed at taxpayers inherently suspect of 
criminal activity, once a taxpayer claims the fifth amendment on an income tax 
return he is equally suspect of criminal activity as an individual who filed a gam-
bling tax return. 
281. When a taxpayer files a gambling tax return, the crimes the taxpayer is incriminated 
of necessarily relate to gambling. When a taxpayer files a fifth amendment tax re-
turn, however, the list of crimes the taxpayer may have committed is expanded to 
other economic crimes such as prostitution and drug trafficking. 
282. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 54. Whether filing a fifth amendment tax return readily pro-
vides evidence that will facilitate a taxpayer's conviction is not settled. See id. Cf 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (impermissible to comment on a criminal 
defendant's failure to testify). 
283. See, e.g., Car/son, 617 F.2d at 520-23 (fifth amendment inapplicable although tax-
payer faced real and appreciable hazard of self-incrimination). 
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refuse to make any return at all. "284 This holding is based on the policy 
that a taxpayer can invoke the fifth amendment for specific privileged 
answers that incriminate the taxpayer.285 The Court assumed, however, 
that certain disclosures were not privileged.286 The Court therefore had 
no reason to consider what a taxpayer should do when every disclosure 
incriminated the taxpayer.287 The assumption that certain disclosures 
are not privileged made the requirement of filing a return logical. 
The Supreme Court's recent analyses of fifth amendment claims are 
more sophisticated than in Sullivan. In Sullivan, the Court noted that 
application of the fifth amendment to the amount of a taxpayer's income 
is extreme and extravagant.288 In Garner, however, the Court assumed a 
taxpayer's income was privileged.289 Marchetti found filing a gambling 
tax return privileged. Analogous to the act of filing a return, the Doe 
Court found the act of producing documents privileged under the fifth 
amendment.29o One commentator recognizes that the government's cur-
rent use of income tax returns makes the filing of such returns potentially 
incriminating for today's taxpayer, although there were no substantial 
hazards of self-incrimination in Sullivan. 291 The government's power to 
collect tax and the need to determine the validity of fifth amendment 
claims, however, leads the same commentator to suggest that Sullivan 
would be affirmed today.292 
The payment of tax and the filing of a return are not causally con-
nected. A taxpayer may pay tax without filing a return and vice versa. 
The filing of a return and disclosure of tax information thereon function 
to permit the government to review the basis of an individual's tax pay-
ments. A taxpayer must prepare a return, or make a similar calculation, 
to determine the exact amount of his annual liability. The filing of the 
return with the final tax payment is, of course, unnecessary for the IRS 
to receive the tax payment. The government's power to collect tax, 
therefore, does not require the filing of an income tax return from indi-
viduals who are incriminated by filing. 
If a taxpayer does not file a return, but instead invokes the fifth 
amendment, there is justified concern over the taxpayer's determination 
that his fifth amendment claim is valid. If masses of taxpayers were to 
refuse to file returns, the IRS would face serious difficulty in determining 
284. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 263-64 (applying fifth amendment to the amount of a taxpayer's income 
would be extreme or extravagant). 
287. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49 (distinguishing Sullivan). 
288. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64. 
289. Garner, 424 U.S. at 649-50, 653. 
290. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-14. 
291. See Administrative Report, supra note 182, at 919. 
292. See Note, Raiding the Confessional - The Use of Income Tax Returns in Nontax 
Criminal Investigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251 (1980); Mansfield, supra note 
146, at 103, 119-20. But see Administrative Report, supra note 178, at 928. 
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which taxpayers had substantial claims for failing to file. 293 The number 
of taxpayers with substantial claims is presumably a small percentage of 
the total population, and many of these taxpayers are not filing returns or 
paying income taxes. The real problem with recognizing a privilege for 
those who are incriminated by filing a return is that many unprivileged 
taxpayers also may refuse to file. 
An undisclosed taxpayer fifth amendment claim recognizes the gov-
ernment's right to determine the validity of fifth amendment claims with-
out requiring a taxpayer to file a return.294 A taxpayer's attorney could 
advise the IRS that an undisclosed taxpayer asserts the fifth amend-
ment's privilege instead of filing a return or the attorney could file a re-
turn for the taxpayer with fifth amendment claims in response to specific 
incriminating questions. If the IRS challenges the taxpayer, a federal 
district court could determine the claim's validity in an action similar to 
one in which the IRS challenges the fifth amendment's application to a 
specific disclosure on a return.295 In this way, taxpayers with invalid 
claims would not be encouraged to claim the fifth amendment because 
the claimant would have to pay the tax liability, and invalid claims would 
not pass judicial scrutiny.296 Meanwhile, taxpayers with valid claims 
would be protected against self-incrimination. Moreover, an undisclosed 
taxpayer's fifth amendment claim facilitates the policy in favor of resolv-
ing fifth amendment claims by judicial determinations. 
When a taxpayer fails to file because disclosure of his income and 
occupation are self-incriminating, a subsequent effort to comply with the 
IRe is difficult. The taxpayer's identity is privileged because disclosure 
provides the government information sufficient to prosecute the taxpayer 
for failure to file. 297 The majority of the remaining information required 
by the return is also privileged.298 If analysis of the remaining informa-
tion reveals all the remaining disclosures are privileged, the taxpayer 
should make an undisclosed taxpayer payment.299 The taxpayer should 
be able to limit his criminal exposure, if any, to failure to file a return. 3OO 
The privilege against filing a return only provides limited protection 
when the initial failure to file was invalid. If the IRS discovers the tax-
payer has failed to file a return, the privilege arising from the previous 
293. Cf Car/son, 617 F.2d at 520. 
294. Although the Constitution does not require "a preliminary-ruling procedure for 
testing the validity of an asserted privilege, ... such a procedure [may] serve the 
best interests of the Government as well as the taxpayer." Garner, 424 U.S. at 664 
(citing Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1955) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
295. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 651-52. 
296. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 54 (the Court will consider insubstantial claims when a tax-
payer has the temerity to raise them). 
297. Baird, 279 F.2d at 631-32. 
298. See supra notes 210-62 and accompanying text. 
299. Baird, 279 F.2d at 631-32; see also Crowley & Manning, supra note 168. 
300. An undisclosed taxpayer payment helps to negate both the willfulness and tax defi-
ciency elements necessary to establish tax fraud. See I.R.c. § 7201 (1982). 
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failure to file does not preclude prosecution for the original failure to file. 
If the taxpayer made a timely undisclosed taxpayer fifth amendment 
claim instead of filing, of course, a prosecution for failure to file should 
not succeed.30\ A subsequent untimely filing, however, may lead to a 
prosecution for failure to file, at the IRS's discretion. 302 A timely undis-
closed taxpayer payment, however, should preclude a conviction for tax 
fraud. 303 
Although a taxpayer may not be privileged from filing a return, the 
IRS may engulf the filing requirement within the fifth amendment's pro-
tection.304 If a taxpayer is privileged from disclosing incriminating infor-
mation and the IRS refuses to accept a return without the incriminating 
information, Marchetti indicates that the taxpayer is privileged from fil-
ing the entire return. 305 There is essentially no difference between the 
IRS requiring incriminating information before accepting a return and 
the situation in Marchetti. In Marchetti, the Court found that gamblers 
were privileged from paying tax because the government refused to ac-
cept payment without a return, and filing a wagering tax return incrimi-
nated the taxpayer. 306 The theory in Marchetti is relatively simple - the 
government cannot require self-incrimination as a condition of comply-
ing with nonincriminating requirements without equally subjecting both 
the nonincriminating and the incriminating disclosures to the fifth 
amendment's protection. 
4. Failing to Pay the Tax Due 
Few situations arise that permit exercising the fifth amendment's 
privilege when failing to pay the tax due. Earning money from illegal 
activities does not make payment of federal income tax privileged.307 
Similarly, a legal obligation to make restitution or another form of repay-
ment of illegal receipts does not prevent liability for income tax. 308 
In Marchetti, the Court relied on two factors to hold that a taxpayer 
properly exercised the fifth amendment by failing to pay the wagering 
tax. First, Marchetti was privileged from filing a return because every 
301. A taxpayer who makes an undisclosed taxpayer claim instead of filing rarely acts in 
bad faith. The government is, therefore, unable to establish the willfulness element 
required for conviction of a tax crime. 
302. See Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1972) (prosecution followed a 
voluntary disclosure). 
303. See supra notes 300-01. 
304. The IRS determines what taxpayer information will be accepted and what will be 
rejected for failure to satisfy the statutory requirements. See Note, Internal Revenue 
Form 1040 and the Fifth Amendment: Self-Reporting or Self-Incrimination, the Tax-
payer's Dilemma, 54 N.D.L. REV. 213, 220 n.75 (1977). 
305. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 60-61; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 65 & n.2. 
306. /d. 
307. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263. 
308. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213,219-20 (1961). See generally Bittker, Taxing 
Income From Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE W. RES. 130 (1974). 
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disclosure on the entire return required self-incrimination.309 Second, 
the government rejected tax payments made without an accompanying 
wagering tax return. 310 Even if a taxpayer is privileged from filing an 
income tax return,311 an attorney may make an "undisclosed taxpayer" 
payment against an individual's tax liability.312 The argument used by 
Marchetti thus is not available for a failure to pay income tax. If the IRS 
refuses to accept an undisclosed taxpayer payment, however, the tax-
payer should be privileged from the act of making payment. 313 The tax-
payer's liability does not change; only the act of making payment 
becomes privileged. 
A major question remaining is whether the undisclosed taxpayer 
system is sufficiently accessible to a taxpayer privileged from making 
most, if not all, of the specific disclosures required on a return so as to 
preclude a valid fifth amendment claim for failing to file a return or make 
a tax payment. A taxpayer who fails to file a return for fear of self-
incrimination, also may fail to pay tax because he is unaware of a method 
to do so without incriminating himself. In any event, the government 
must obtain independent knowledge of a taxpayer's liability before the 
taxpayer needs to assert the privilege for failure to pay tax. 314 The gov-
ernment, therefore, would possess at least some of the incriminating 
information. 
B. Waiver or Loss of the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
A taxpayer's right to claim the fifth amendment at trial or in re-
sponse to an IRS summons often depends on whether the taxpayer prop-
erly claimed the privilege at a prior time. When a taxpayer validly 
claims the privilege on his return315 or claims the privilege by failing to 
file, the taxpayer may raise the fifth amendment's protection in response 
to an IRS summons or at triaPI6 If a taxpayer's claim is not privileged 
but was made in good faith, the taxpayer may claim the fifth amendment 
until provided a judicial ruling.317 When a taxpayer fails to make a 
timely assertion of the privilege, the status of the privilege depends on the 
disclosure made. If incriminating information is disclosed, the privilege 
is lost unless the government compelled the disclosure.318 If incriminat-
ing information is not disclosed, there is no reason to lose the fifth 
309. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49; see also Grosso, 390 U.S. at 6S. 
310. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 41 n.1., 42-43; see also Grosso, 390 U.S. at 6S n.2. 
311. See supra notes 263-306 and accompanying text. 
312. Crowley & Manning, supra note 168, at 290-91. 
313. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 6S & n.2; Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-14 (act of producing business 
records privileged). 
314. If the IRS does not know a taxpayer owes taxes, it will not be able to bring an action 
against the taxpayer. 
315. See Garner, 424 U.S. 648. 
316. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50-51. 
317. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 662-63 (protection based on § 7203 standard of willfulness). 
318. See id. at 653. 
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amendment's protection. Several cases, however, indicate that the privi-
lege is lost when not claimed timely.319 In these cases, however, the tax-
payer usually disclosed the incriminating information.320 
When a taxpayer avoids disclosure of the information by failing to 
file and the failure was not privileged, the fifth amendment should apply 
to specific disclosures irrespective of the unprivileged failure to file. If the 
taxpayer failed to file invalidly but in good faith, the fifth amendment 
should protect against disclosure of any incriminating information. A 
failure to file is a criminal violation for which the taxpayer may claim the 
fifth amendment.32\ If the IRS claims that the fifth amendment's protec-
tion is lost for the specific disclosures, the taxpayer may claim the privi-
lege for the failure to file. In any event, the government is unlikely to 
succeed if it claims the fifth amendment's protection is lost when a tax-
payer does not disclose incriminating information. 
Even when a taxpayer discloses incriminating information, the fifth 
amendment may preclude the government's use of the information. The 
fifth amendment not only permits a taxpayer to remain silent, but also 
protects against the use of compelled information.322 Although disclo-
sures on a return are not compelled, the filing of an income tax return is 
compelled.323 If a taxpayer is privileged from filing an income tax return, 
the taxpayer's act of filing the return should be protected. Some courts, 
however, may determine that filing an income tax return is not compelled 
because the taxpayer could have made an undisclosed taxpayer fifth 
amendment claim or because there is policy in favor of resolving fifth 
amendment claims by judicial determination rather than taxpayer 
determination. 
Claiming the fifth amendment in the appropriate manner is always 
the taxpayer's best alternative. Although the burden is on the taxpayer 
to make the initial claim,324 the burden to argue for disclosure is appar-
ently on the government once a claim is made.325 When the incriminat-
ing nature of requested information is apparent, a judge will not require 
disclosure.326 When the incriminating nature of requested information is 
not apparent, the taxpayer is given the opportunity to explain why the 
information is incriminating.327 The judge, however, should not require 
the taxpayer to admit guilt to avoid incriminating himself. 328 
319. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931). 
320. See, e.g., Garner, 424 U.S. at 649-50. 
321. See 1.R.c. § 7203 (1982). 
322. Garner, 424 U.S. at 653. 
323. !d. at 652. 
324. [d. at 655. 
325. See id. at 655-56 (taxpayer's burden is limited to a timely invoking of the privilege). 
326. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). 
327. [d.; Garner, 424 U.S. at 658-59 n.ll. 
328. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 34 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., concurring». 
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C. Good Faith 
The good faith defense allows an individual to invoke the fifth 
amendment in an unclear situation without facing criminal liability. In a 
footnote, the Garner Court indicated that an individual who erroneously 
invokes the fifth amendment on a tax return may defend a criminal pros-
ecution for failure to file, based on the taxpayer's good faith intent to 
exercise a constitutional privilege. 329 The constitutional source of the 
good faith defense, however, is contradicted by the same Court's textual 
reasoning - the fifth amendment protects a taxpayer with a valid claim 
and section 7203's willfulness requirement broadens the constitutional 
protection.330 The Court, however, previously had established good faith 
as a statutory defense to a section 7203 prosecution.331 Whether the fifth 
amendment protects an erroneous but good faith claim remains an open 
question.332 
The source of the good faith defense may be insignificant because of 
the breadth of the statutory good faith defense. To establish that a tax-
payer lacked statutory good faith, the government must show "a volun-
tary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."333 There is, however, 
some limitation on the taxpayer's use of the good faith defense. For ex-
ample, a good faith claim does not transmute an invalid fifth amendment 
claim into a valid one. 334 A taxpayer who makes an invalid fifth amend-
ment claim in good faith must eventually make a disclosure. 
There are three steps a taxpayer should take to prevent the govern-
ment from establishing bad faith. First, a claimant should present a fifth 
amendment claim to the government. The claim may be for specific dis-
closures on a return or in the form of an undisclosed taxpayer fifth 
amendment claim. The government is then hard pressed to prove that 
the taxpayer intended to violate a legal duty because the taxpayer's mo-
tive is to preserve the privilege until his legal duty is judicially deter-
mined. Second, a taxpayer should seek legal advice. When a taxpayer is 
329. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663 n.18 (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 397 
(1933». 
330. [d. at 662-63. 
331. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973). 
332. See Note, supra note 304, at 225-29. 
333. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976). The taxpayer's good faith ne-
gates the willfulness element and precludes a conviction. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663 
n.18. 
334. See United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 447 U.S. 925 
(1980). Neff argued that a sincere belief was sufficient to validate the assertion of 
one's privilege. [d. at 1241. Policy against taxpayers' being the final arbiters of 
their claims of privilege dictates that Neff's argument cannot prevail. BUI cf 
Marchelli, 390 U.S. 39 (taxpayer could exercise fifth amendment by failing to file 
and failing to pay the wagering tax). Whether one's objective good faith is sufficient 
to establish a valid claim is unclear. The Court stated that "[Marchetti] was re-
quired ... to provide information which he might reasonably suppose would be 
available to prosecuting authorities." /d. at 48. The Court found that Marchetti's 
claim was valid. /d. at 54. 
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advised by an attorney to claim the privilege, it will be difficult for the 
government to prove that the taxpayer knew there was a legal duty to 
perform the proscribed act rather than invoke the fifth amendment. 
Third, a taxpayer should make an undisclosed taxpayer payment when 
necessary. A payment of tax negates the substantial tax deficiency ele-
ment of tax fraud. Payment also affirmatively establishes the taxpayer's 
honest effort to comply with his legal duty. 
Because the fifth amendment is lost when not properly claimed, a 
taxpayer is forced to claim the privilege when its application is uncertain. 
If constitutional rights are so fragile that an improper move destroys the 
right, courts should rarely find that taxpayers acted in bad faith when 
claiming the fifth amendment. The government should carry the burden 
of establishing that the taxpayer claimed the privilege for a reason other 
than the preservation of a constitutional right. As long as a taxpayer 
makes an undisclosed taxpayer payment, the government should not be 
able to assert that the taxpayer invoked the privilege to avoid payment of 
federal income taxes. 
IV. REQUIRED RECORDS 
Although United States v. Doe 335 expressly applies to business 
records rather than records required by law,336 many of the Court's ex-
amples of business records were also income tax records. 337 The Court's 
express exclusion of required records338 from the scope of its opinion 
does not imply that the fifth amendment provides broader protection for 
income tax records than for business records. If the Doe Court's fifth 
amendment analysis of business records applies to tax records, however, 
the payment of tax by individuals involved in illegal activity becomes 
almost impossible unless those taxpayers relinquish a substantial portion 
of their fifth amendment protection by voluntarily creating incriminating 
tax records. 
The fifth amendment permits an individual to remain silent and pro-
tects against governmental use of compelled statements. When a tax-
payer discloses incriminating information on an income tax return, 
however, the fifth amendment privilege is lost because the taxpayer has 
the free choice to remain silent. Incriminating disclosures on income tax 
returns are deemed to be voluntary rather than compelled disclosures. In 
Doe, the Court determined that taxpayers voluntarily prepare business 
records. The Doe Court thus implied that taxpayers have the choice to 
claim the fifth amendment instead of preparing business records. If Doe 
applies to tax records, a taxpayer likewise would be entitled to claim the 
fifth amendment in lieu of preparing incriminating tax records. 
335. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
336. [d. at 607 n.3. 
337. [d. at 607 n.!. 
338. [d. at 607 & n.3. 
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There are significant problems that result from a taxpayer's failure 
to prepare tax records that do not occur when a taxpayer claims the fifth 
amendment instead of making specific disclosures on an income tax re-
turn. A taxpayer who claims the fifth amendment on a return can calcu-
late the tax liability incurred during the year. The government also can 
ascertain the taxpayer's liability by granting use immunity.339 On the 
other hand, a taxpayer who claims the fifth amendment by failing to cre-
ate tax records cannot determine the tax liability incurred during the 
year. Even if the government grants the taxpayer immunity, it cannot 
ascertain the taxpayer's liability because there are no tax records from 
which the taxpayer's liability can be calculated. 
One solution is for the Court to apply fifth amendment analysis in 
the following manner, and thereby distinguish business records, income 
tax returns, and tax records. The government does not require taxpayers 
to prepare business records, and, therefore, business records are properly 
viewed as voluntarily prepared.34O The government does require taxpay-
ers to file income tax returns,341 but specific questions on an income tax 
form generally do not create substantial hazards of self-incrimination be-
cause a taxpayer can avoid self-incrimination by claiming the fifth 
amendment for specific disclosures instead of making incriminating dis-
closures.342 As for tax records, however, the government requires tax-
payers to prepare tax records343 and a taxpayer can avoid substantial 
hazards of self-incrimination only by failing to prepare incriminating tax 
records. The significant difference between tax returns and tax records is 
a taxpayer's inability to create tax records without losing the fifth amend-
ment's protection for the contents of the incriminating disclosures. 344 
Once the unique nature of income tax records is recognized, the re-
maining issue is whether a taxpayer facing substantial hazards of self-
incrimination can invoke the fifth amendment validly instead of prepar-
ing incriminating tax records. As already noted, a taxpayer's failure to 
prepare tax records significantly impairs the functioning of the tax sys-
tem. Whenever possible, the Constitution should be interpreted to up-
hold the government's taxing power. The Court could provide 
protection for tax records by either considering them as compeUed docu-
ments or by placing a use restriction upon them. The Court, however, 
has exercised extreme restraint when requested to impose use immunity 
judiciaUy.345 If a taxpayer prepares incriminating tax records and loses 
the fifth amendment's protection for the contents of the records, the tax-
339. Although the IRS is authorized to compel disclosures in exchange for immunity, the 
IRS does not do so in practice. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 652 n.6. 
340. Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-12. 
341. Garner, 424 U.S. at 652. 
342. Id. at 653, 665. 
343. I.R.C. § 6001 (1982). 
344. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-12 (contents of business records voluntarily prepared, and 
thus, unprivileged). 
345. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614-17; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-61. 
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payer still could invoke the fifth amendment for the incriminatory effects 
of producing the tax records to the government. 346 
v. CONCLUSION 
A taxpayer must analyze each disclosure on a return to determine 
whether disclosure creates substantial hazards of self-incrimination. The 
taxpayer should not disclose information that incriminates the taxpayer 
of a tax or nontax crime unless granted immunity as broad as the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Each disclosure is ana-
lyzed as if all the other required information is disclosed on the return. 
In all circumstances, a taxpayer should make a complete tax payment 
unless the government conditions acceptance of the payment on the dis-
closure of incriminating information. No matter what information is 
deemed privileged, the taxpayer's claim always is made to the govern-
ment. When the amount of income is privileged, an undisclosed taxpayer 
payment is made through the taxpayer's attorney. If the filing require-
ment is privileged, the taxpayer makes an undisclosed taxpayer payment 
and an undisclosed taxpayer fifth amendment claim. 
Richard B. Stanley 
346. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-12. 
